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Protecting Economic Liberties
Bernard H. Siegan*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article details the evolution of the treatment of economic
liberties, beginning with the Magna Cartas of 1215 and 1225. The
Magna Cartas were the original source of protection from govern-
mental intrusion upon economic liberties. The Article considers
Sir Edward Coke and William Blackstone's interpretations of the
Magna Carta both in their writings and in common law cases.
Next, the Article traces the influence of Coke and Blackstone's
writings, and of the English common law on American jurispru-
dence, including a discussion of how these influences affected the
United States Constitution. The Article subsequently examines
numerous United States Supreme Court cases, mapping the major
shifts in the Supreme Court's protections-or lack thereof-of eco-
nomic liberties. In conclusion, the Article considers the impact of
the judicial termination for protections of economic rights.
II. THE MAGNA CARTAS OF 1215 AND 1225 t
To quell the barons' revolt against him, John, King of En-
gland and Ireland, in 1215 accepted the Magna Carta, a document
which the barons largely wrote and which was the first govern-
mental document in the English-speaking countries to protect eco-
nomic and other liberties.1 John's own oppressive and arbitrary
* Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. This article contains and
expands views that Professor Siegan has expressed in books and articles he has written as
follows: ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (1980), PROPERTY RIGHTS: FROM
MAGNA CARTA TO THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (Social Philosophy & Policy Foundation &
Transaction Publishers, 2001), Separation of Powers & Economic Liberties, 70 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 415 (1995), and Majorities May Limit the People's Liberties Only When Authorized
To Do So by the Constitution, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 309 (1990). In the following paper,
many quotations from antique sources reproduce obsolete or incorrect spellings which ap-
pear in the original. These are reproduced without the customary "sic" designation, be-
cause using "sic" after all of these unique spellings would become cumbersome for the
reader. Many of the cases discussed in this paper were written in Law French, a mixture of
Latin, Norman French, and English, which constituted a unique legal language until the
seventeenth century.
t The language and ideas in Sections II through IV.B. are largely drawn from BER-
NARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY RIGHTS: FROM THE MAGNA CARTA TO THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT 7-82 (SOcIAL PHILOSOPHY & POLICY FOUNDATION & TRANSACTION PUBLISHERS 2001).
1 1 DAVID HUME, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE INVASION OF JULIUS CAESAR TO
THE ABDICATION OF JAMES THE SECOND 394-440 (1985); GEORGE MACAULAY TREVELYAN,
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behavior, including confiscation of the barons' properties and im-
position of confiscatory taxes, caused the revolt.2 In the Magna
Carta, John agreed to undo the deprivations he had arbitrarily
imposed in the past and to not impose oppressive measures in the
future.3 In Chapter 52 of this Magna Carta, the King agreed that
if anyone "has been dispossessed or removed by us, without the
legal judgment of his peers, from his lands, castles, franchises, or
from his right, we will immediately restore them to him."4 Chap-
ter 55 provided that all "fines made with us unjustly and against
the law of the land, and all amercements imposed unjustly and
against the law of the land, shall be entirely remitted."5 Thus
King John had acceded to the barons' demand for restitution.
The barons also sought protection from future transgressions.
King John's major commitments for the future were those con-
tained in Chapter 39, which is usually freely translated from the
Latin as follows: "No freeman shall be taken or [and] imprisoned
or disseised or exiled or in any way destroyed ... except by the
lawful judgment of his peers or [and] by the law of the land."6
Accordingly, he agreed that in the future he would not deprive
freemen of their lives, liberties, or properties unless it was re-
quired by a legitimate law, and then, only pursuant to fair and
proper procedures.7 He thereby relinquished authority to apply
retroactive or other oppressive laws destroying or damaging
freemen as had previously been his practice. A comparable chap-
ter was included in the many subsequent issues of the Magna
Carta. Chapter 39 thus introduced the concept of due process of
law in English and American law as a protection against govern-
mental oppression.8
Shortly after John executed the Charter, Pope Innocent III
forbade the King to obey, or the barons to enforce, its terms. 9 In
August 1215, King John recalled all of the liberties he had granted
his subjects in the charter and repudiated its restraints upon
him.1" He died in October 1216, and was succeeded by his son
Henry III.11
HISTORY OF ENGLAND 168-76 (2d ed. 1926); GOLDWIN SMITH, A HISTORY OF ENGLAND 78-84
(2d ed. 1957).
2 HUME, supra note 1, at 430; SMITH, supra note 1, at 78-79.
3 SMITH, supra note 1, at 79.
4 WILLIAM SHARP McKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHAR-
TER OF KING JOHN 448 (Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2d ed. 2000) (1914).
5 Id. at 454.
6 Id. at 375.
7 HumE, supra note 1, at 430-31.
8 See SMITH, supra note 1, at 80.
9 Id.
lo Id.
11 Id. at 81.
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While for the most part the monarchy after King John's death
respected the rights of the barons, there were enough violations to
arouse fears that it did not in fact accept limitations on its powers.
To reduce and terminate conflicts with the barons, and to obtain
their support, the young King Henry's regents (Henry was nine
years old at his father's death) reissued King John's charter in
Henry's name on two occasions. In 1225, after he assumed per-
sonal control of the throne, King Henry III in a special ceremony
executed a document also referred to as Magna Carta. Henry
identified this document as a confirmation of the original charter.
The 1225 document is considered the definitive version of the
Magna Carta. Henry and his successor, Edward I, each confirmed
it three times and Parliament did likewise many times thereafter,
amounting by 1628 to thirty-two in total.12 Each subsequent issue
followed the form of the 1225 version, which was by statute de-
clared to be "the birthright of the people of England." 3 These con-
firmations accorded the Magna Carta status as part of the
common law of England.
Chapter 29 of the 1225 charter broadened and replaced Chap-
ter 39 of King John's charter and provided as follows:
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised of his
freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled,
or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor
condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law
of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to
any man either justice or right. 4
By its terms, Chapter 29 of the 1225 Charter was a greater
limitation on royal powers than Chapter 39 of John's Charter, but
its meaning, and that of subsequent confirmatory statutes, had to
await interpretation by the common-law judges. The English peo-
ple regarded Henry's Magna Carta-and subsequent statutes
broadening its guarantees-as preserving and protecting their
lives, liberties, and properties. Those who migrated to America,
and their descendants who lived there, asserted these "rights of
Englishmen" against restraints imposed by the English
authorities.
III. COKE AND BLACKSTONE INTERPRET THE COMMON LAW
A. Edward Coke and "The Law of the Land"
Edward Coke (1551-1634) was a major figure in English law.
At various times, he was attorney general for the queen, chief jus-
12 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *123-24.
13 1 id. at 124.
14 EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *45
(William S. Hein Co. 1986) (1797) [hereinafter COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES].
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tice both of the Court of Common Pleas and of the King's Bench,
and speaker of the House of Commons. Among other publications,
he authored a four-volume commentary on English law entitled
Institutes of the Laws of England (1600-1615). 1 In the Second In-
stitute, he interpreted King Henry III's 1225 Magna Carta, con-
firming its high status in English law. 16 On both sides of the
Atlantic Ocean, Coke's interpretation was regarded as highly au-
thoritative on the meaning of the Charter and subsequent confir-
mations of it. The Institutes were held in such high esteem in
America that they were required reading for most colonial law-
yers. According to the noted historian Professor Bernard Bailyn,
Coke was cited almost everywhere in colonial American
literature. 7
Although some commentators have criticized Coke's writings,
Coke's influence "as the embodiment of the common law, was so
strong that it is useless to contend that he 'was either misled by
his sources or consciously misinterpreted them,' for Coke's mis-
takes, it is said, are the common law."i" In his Institutes, Coke
accepted King Henry's 1225 Magna Carta as the definitive Char-
ter, and he discussed and interpreted its various chapters in light
of the additions and interpretations subsequently made to it by
the Parliament, judicial decisions, and legal commentaries. Most
English and American courts accepted Coke's interpretation of
Chapter 29 as authoritative on the meaning of "law of the land"
and "due process of law," and numerous United States federal and
state judicial opinions have cited his interpretations of the Magna
Carta and the common law. Coke has been appropriately referred
to by Roscoe Pound, the celebrated legal scholar, as "the great
light of our legal system." 9
By the time Coke wrote the second volume of his Institutes,
the monarchy, Parliament, and the courts had greatly expanded
and supplemented the 1225 charter. Coke viewed the common
law-with much of its basis in the Magna Carta-as a restraint
on the powers of the monarchy and various other governmental
bodies including the Parliament. He relied mostly on the judiciary
to protect the people from oppression by government. The com-
mon law is, he opined, "the best and most common birth-right that
the subject hath for the safeguard and defence, not only of his
15 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Wil-
liam S. Hein Co. 1986) (1600-1615) [hereinafter COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES].
16 COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES, supra note 14, at *A4.
17 BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 30
(1967).
18 W. J. Brockelbank, The Role of Due Process in American Constitutional Law, 39
CORNELL L.Q. 561, 562 (1954) (quoting Lyon, The Lawyer and Magna Carta, 23 ROCKY
MTN. L. REV. 416, 431 (1951)).
'9 Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 459 (1908-09).
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goods, lands and revenues, but of his wife and children, his body,
fame, and life also."
2°
Coke found the meaning of "law of the land" in a 1363 statute
of King Edward III that states "that no man be taken, imprisoned,
or put out of his free-hold without process of the law; that is, by
indictment or presentment of good and lawfull men, where such
deeds be done in due manner, or by writ originall of the common
law."2' Coke explained that this provision requires that no man
shall be deprived of his liberties and possessions "[wlithout being
brought in to answer but by due process of the common law."22 He
wrote that the law of the land includes only a general public law,
operating equally upon every person in the community, and it is a
law not intended to favor or harm certain individuals but to ex-
tend to all.23 The last sentence of Chapter 29 emphasizes the
king's commitment to rule neutrally and impartially: the monarch
promised he "will not deny or defer to any man either justice or
right."24 Judges appointed by the king were given the power to
enforce these commitments.
Coke illustrated this judicial power in his Institutes by sum-
marizing two common-law decisions that applied the provision in
Chapter 29 of King Henry's Magna Carta, which stated that no
"freeman shall be ... disseised of his freehold, or liberties, or free
customs":
1. A custome was alledged in the town of C. that if the tenant
cease[d] [to pay rent for] two yeares, that the lord should
enter into the freehold of the tenant, and hold the same untill
he were satisfied of the arrerages, and it was adjudged a cus-
tome against the law of the land, to enter into a mans free-
hold in that case without action or answer.
2. King Henry, the sixth, graunted to the corporation of diers
within London, power to search, and if they found any cloth
died with logwood, that the cloth should be forfeit; and it was
adjudged, that this charter concerning the forfeiture, was
against the law of the land, and this statute: for no forfeiture
can grow by letters patents. No man ought to be put from his
livelihood without answer.25
As revealed in these two cases, protection of property and eco-
nomic rights was quite broad in Coke's day, extending to the pos-
session of certain leasehold interests as well as to ownership of
certain dyed cloths and to business enterprises using these cloths.
20 COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES, supra note 15, at *142.a.
21 COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES, supra note 14, at *50.
22 Id.
23 Id. '[Blut that the law might extend to all, it is said per legem terra [by the law of
the land]." Id.
24 Id. at *45.
25 Id. at *45-47.
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In each case, the court held that the law of the land required a
judicial hearing to determine whether existing law authorized a
termination of the lessee's or owner's interest. The lease in ques-
tion was apparently sufficient in law to warrant common law pro-
tection for the lessee. The Magna Carta prohibited the king from
confiscating property on his own behalf, and the logwood case ex-
tended this rule to apply to a confiscatory action by the king on
behalf of a private group.
Consequently, the lord in the first example had a much
stronger legal case. While King Henry's grant might have been a
retroactive deprivation of the right of a person to use cloth dyed
with logwood, the lord's case involved a custom which presumably
existed when the leasehold was executed and therefore was not
retroactive with respect to it. Nevertheless, common law princi-
ples prohibited any person from being a judge in his own cause.
Accordingly, the lord was devoid of power to limit the lessee's pos-
sessory interest without a judicial resolution of the controversy in
the lord's favor. The failure to pay rent as agreed was likely suffi-
cient reason to enable the lord to obtain possession. The lessee
was, however, entitled to submit defenses to the action in court,
something which the local custom prevented. Here, the Magna
Carta, as interpreted by the common-law courts, afforded process
where none had previously been due.
In sum, according to the common law interpretation of Chap-
ter 29 of the 1225 Magna Carta, no person shall be deprived of his
property or his livelihood except when it is done in accordance
with the law of the land. This protection requires three things: (1)
the law which is alleged to have been violated must have been in
existence and applicable when the violation occurred; (2) the law
must be consistent with common law requirements for legitimacy;
and (3) a fair and proper judicial trial conforming to the require-
ments of due process must be held to determine if wrongdoing has
occurred that warrants a deprivation.
As the foregoing discussion reveals, Coke viewed Chapter 29
as a substantive protection of the people's liberties from limitation
by the royal power. The argument is often made that Chapter 29
imposed only procedural requirements, that is, its protections only
went so far as to require that a deprivation of life, liberty, or prop-
erty by the king or his appointees be achieved with a fair and
proper judicial process.26 This would mean that the prohibition or
deprivation is satisfied when the law has been passed pursuant to
the required legal processes. Were this the case, life, liberty, and
property would then truly be at the discretion of the lawmaker
26 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 223-40 (1990).
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and the judiciary would simply be a conduit to implementing
these discretionary laws. Such an interpretation would under-
mine the libertarian objectives of Chapter 29, and thus this inter-
pretation cannot be attributed to Coke, who generally supported
individual rights. Coke believed that the reason for depriving the
citizen of his rights must be found in a legitimately enacted law,
and not a retroactive one passed for the purpose of curtailing an
existing right.
The purpose and effect of the Magna Carta corroborates
Coke's belief that the Charter provided substantive protections.
In the Charter, King John agreed to restore the properties he had
illegally seized and remit the monies he had illegally collected. In
the original and all subsequent confirmations of the Magna Carta,
the king promised that he would never deprive a law-abiding per-
son of his liberties. Chapter 29 was intended to limit the arbitrary
exercise of power, not to secure it merely by the application of due
process procedures. For if "law of the land" meant any law the
king might impose, then the provision would be a nullity.27
1. The Supremacy of the Common Law
Coke's notion that the courts have a decisive role in the inter-
pretation of English law is evident from the famous ruling about
judicial power made in Dr. Bonham's Case by the Court of Com-
mon Pleas in 1610, of which Coke was Chief Justice.28 The Court
ruled that the London College of Physicians was not entitled to
punish Dr. Bonham for practicing medicine without its approval,
despite Parliament's passage of an act authorizing this penalty.29
In his decision, Coke declared the following:
And it appears in our books, that in many cases, the common
law will controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge
them to be utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament is against
common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be per-
formed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act
to be void.3°
This declaration crystallized Coke's view that the Magna Carta
offered substantive as well as procedural protections.
Dr. Bonham's Case was concerned with Parliament's im-
proper infringement on economic liberties. Parliament denied
Bonham the right to practice his profession. While the purpose of
the law-protecting the public health-was legitimate, its means
were both overinclusive because it applied to graduates of very
27 Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 432-33 (1856) (Selden, J., concurring).
28 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B. 1610).
29 Id. at 651.
30 Id. at 652 (citations omitted).
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prestigious medical schools, as well as underinclusive because it
applied only to persons who practiced medicine in London for
more than thirty days.3 1 Worst of all, the law violated the basic
common law rule that no one should be a judge in his own cause:
officials of the college received one-half of the fines it imposed on
those who practiced medicine without its consent.2
Nevertheless, despite all the infirmities of this law, it was not
initially clear that the court had any power over the Parliament.
Coke's court decided that it did, a decision which some in the En-
glish bar disapproved of, but which met with great approval in
English America. Since the source of the common law was the
Magna Carta, which only applied to the monarchy, a considerable
number of English judges believed the judiciary had no authority
over Parliament. The issue of common law jurisdiction in En-
gland was finally settled in 1688 when, as a result of the Glorious
Revolution, the Parliament achieved supreme authority over the
English government. 3
When the English settlers migrated to America, they were as-
sured by the English authorities that they were entitled to the
same protections and benefits of English law that they would have
enjoyed if they had remained in England. The colonial courts
before the revolution, and the United States courts after it, fol-
lowed and applied the common law. The fact that as of 1688, Par-
liament acquired total sovereignty in England did not affect the
common law on either side of the Atlantic Ocean, except with re-
spect to the final authority of the Parliament.
Coke's proclamation in Dr. Bonham's Case that the common
law governed acts of Parliament was used in the American colo-
nies to justify resistance to the British Parliament and by jurists
after the American Revolution as a basis for judicial review. The
American colonists often cited Coke as proclaiming the supremacy
of the common law, and many political leaders invoked Coke in
opposition to regulation. Thus, a prevailing argument against the
highly condemned Stamp Act of 1765, pursuant to which England
imposed substantial taxes on the colonies, none of which had ever
consented to it, was that it violated "Magna Carta and the natural
rights of Englishmen, and therefore[,] according to Lord Coke[,]
null and void."34 George Mason, the author of the Virginia Decla-
31 Id. at 651-52.
32 Id. at 652.
33 In English history, the Glorious Revolution was the culmination of the events of
1688, which resulted in the "forced abdication" of James II, and the accession of William III
and Mary II. Douglas W. Vick, The Human Rights Act and the British Constitution, 37
TEX. INT'L. L.J. 329, 333 n.28 (2002). For an extended discussion of the Glorious Revolu-
tion, see G.M. TREVELYAN, THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION, 1688-1689 (1938).
34 Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 941, 970
(1990).
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ration of Rights and a Framer of the United States Constitution,
cited Coke in a 1772 Virginia case3" as authority for the proposi-
tion that "[a]ll acts of legislature apparently contrary to natural
right and justice, are, in our laws, and must be in the nature of
things, considered as void."36 Thus, Coke's view informed the very
beginnings of American jurisprudence.
Other commentators have expounded on Coke's concept of the
common law. For example, a major characteristic of the common
law is what Roscoe Pound, who has written extensively on it, re-
ferred to as "extreme individualism."37 The common law, wrote
Pound, "is concerned not with social righteousness but with indi-
vidual rights .... It is jealous of all interference with individual
freedom of action, physical, mental, or economic." 3 The impact of
the common law has been enormous. Writers have noted the
strong link between the industrial revolution and the arrival of
the common law in England. 9 Since the collapse of communism,
its rules are operative in much of the world, including the vast
areas formerly dominated by that ideology.
2. Common Law Protections of Economic Liberties
Among other freedoms, the common law in the period when
Bonham was decided protected many economic liberties. As the
subsequent cases illustrate, English courts upheld the liberty of a
person to practice the trade, occupation, or vocation of his choice
and held that an economic monopoly was void.40
a. Illegal Monopolies and Other Restraints on Practice
of Trade
In Davenant v. Hurdis,41 a tailors' guild known as the Com-
pany of Merchant Taylors of London adopted an ordinance pursu-
ant to its royal charter, which required every member who sends
cloth to be finished by additional labor to have at least half the
work done by members of the guild or pay the guild ten shillings
per cloth.4 2 In his capacity as an attorney, Coke represented Dav-
35 Robin v. Hardaway, 2 Va. (2 Jefferson) 109, 114 (1772).
36 Id. at 115.
37 RoscoE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAw 13 (1921) (defining "extreme indi-
vidualism" as "unlimited valuation of individual liberty and respect for individual
property").
38 Id. at 13-14.
39 See TOM BETHELL, THE NOBLEST TRIUMPH: PROPERTY AND PROSPERITY THROUGH THE
AGES 87-91 (1998).
40 Cf READINGS ON THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAW 218-35 (Roscoe
Pound & Theodore F. T. Plucknett eds., 1927) (noting that "there were three classes of
persons who were in a varying degree exempt from [the common law], the priest, the Jew,
and the merchant"). Id. at 218.
41 72 Eng. Rep. 769 (K.B. 1599).
42 Id. at 770.
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enant, a cloth merchant who sent out twenty cloths to be finished,
and refused to give an equal number to guild members, attacking
the ordinance as tending to create a monopoly.43 Coke argued that
while members were then compelled only to hire their fellow mem-
bers to make or finish half their cloth, a ruling upholding the ordi-
nance might well in time include all of every member's cloth.44
The result would be a monopoly, the establishment of which, he
said, is against common law and void. The judges agreed holding
that the ordinance:
[W]as against the common law, because it was against the lib-
erty of the subject: for every subject, by the law, has freedom
and liberty to put his cloth to be dressed by what clothworker he
pleases, and cannot be restrained to certain persons, for that in
effect would be a monopoly; and, therefore, such ordinance, by
colour of a charter, or any grant by charter to such effect, would
be void.4
They explained that "a rule of such nature as to bring all trade or
traffic into the hands of one company, or one person, and to ex-
clude all others, is illegal.""
Based in part on the decision in Davenant, Darcy v. Allen
(also known as The Case of Monopolies)47 held that a grant of let-
ters patent by Queen Elizabeth to Darcy, her groom, for the exclu-
sive making, importing, and merchandising of playing cards
contravened common law and was void.4 Unlike the Davenant
case, which involved an ordinance of a guild, the Monopolies case
concerned a royal grant. Coke did not participate as a judge in the
latter decision since he was at the time Solicitor General and re-
sponsible for defending the contested patent." He had long main-
tained that a monopoly was forbidden by the Civil Law, and by the
Magna Carta, as well as by certain statutes. That he accepted
(and applauded) the ruling is evident from his inclusion of its prin-
ciples in defining the meaning of liberties in Chapter 29.10 The
defendant pleaded that as a resident of London he was protected
under the Magna Carta to engage freely in commerce, and this
included obtaining royal grants.51 The Monopolies decision held
that the grant created various monopolies and that a monopoly
was against the common law because it limited trade to the detri-
43 Id.
44 Id. at 771.
45 The Case of Monopolies, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260, 1263 (K.B. 1603) (dicussing the ratio-
nale in Davenant).
46 Davenant v. Hurdis, 72 Eng. Rep. 769 (IB. 1599) (per author's own translation).
47 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1603).
48 Id. at 1263-64.
49 Id. at 1261.
5o See COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES, supra note 14, at *47.
51 The Case of Monopolies, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1261.
[Vol. 6:43
Protecting Economic Liberties
ment and the liberty and welfare of the people, in three respects:
(1) it raised the prices of playing cards; (2) it impaired their qual-
ity; and (3) it denied a living to various workmen. 2 Not by the
Crown, but only by Parliament, could a man be restrained from
exercising a trade.53
Similar to Davenant, The Case of the Tailors of Ipswich54 in-
volved the validity of a tailors' guild ordinance adopted pursuant
to a royal charter. The ordinance mandated that no one could
practice the trade of a tailor in Ipswich unless he had served his
apprenticeship with the Corporation of the Tailors of Ipswich, or
had been given its approval. The defendant ignored the corpora-
tion and worked as a tailor, pleading to the court that he had
served seven years as a private tailor to a freeman of the locality.55
Chief Justice Coke and the other justices of the King's Bench held
for the tailor, asserting that the Corporation's restraints on the
tailor practicing his trade tended to create a monopoly, and thus
"are against the liberty and freedom of the subject."56
The justices cited two cases in which restraints on workmen
practicing their trades were held to be against the common law.
First, a restriction on a dyer not to practice his craft for two
years,5 '7 and second, a restriction on a husbandman not to sow his
land. 8 Interestingly, the justices went on to note what had be-
come a common complaint in the twentieth century against licen-
sure laws: they are a means "of oppression of young tradesmen, by
the old and rich of the same trade, not permitting them to work in
their trade freely."59 Apprentice requirements, the justices stated,
have been enacted not only to make workmen skillful, but also to
educate youth in lawful sciences and trades.6 ° Laws which accord
trade organizations power to forbid experienced apprentices from
practicing as tradesmen discourage apprenticeship, to the detri-
ment of both the young and the society as a whole.6
52 Id. at 1263.
53 Id. at 1263-64. In 1624, Parliament enacted the Statute of Monopolies drafted
principally by Coke when he was a member of Parliament, which terminated the power of
the monarchy and Parliament to grant private monopolies. However, the act reserved to
Parliament the power to grant certain exclusive privileges and contained a considerable
number of exceptions among which was the continuance of the power of cities, boroughs,
guilds, and chartered trading organizations to exercise many of their monopoly powers.
Political expediency and the need to accommodate special interests seems to explain the
failure of the statute to be more inclusive.
54 77 Eng. Rep. 1218 (K.B. 1614).
55 Id. at 1219.
56 Id. at 1220.
57 Id. at 1219.
5s Id.
59 Id. at 1220.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 1219.
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In Tooley's Case,62 the accused person was prosecuted for vio-
lating the Statute of Artificers because he was engaged in work as
an upholsterer after he had served his apprenticeship as a wool
packer. The statute required that a person must be apprenticed
in the trade that he practiced, but did not specify the trades to
which it applied.63 Coke interpreted the statute as covering only
skilled trades, stating that an upholsterer was clearly not covered
by the statute since it was neither a "trade nor [a] mystery" and
did not require any skill.64 Moreover, the defendant was a resi-
dent of London, a city that permitted a freeman to practice any
trade or manual occupation within its area, a custom which had
been protected in both the 1215 and 1225 Magna Cartas and also
recognized by royal charter and confirmed by Parliament.65 The
Statute of Artificers excluded the city from its scope.6 According
to Coke, a "general law shall not take away any part of Magna
Charta; [and consequently] ... a man is not to be restrained that
he shall not labor for his living."67 The court terminated the prose-
cution of the accused.68
In Rogers v. Parrey,69 the plaintiff sued the defendant on the
ground that he had violated an agreement made for adequate con-
sideration that he would not practice the trade of a joyner for
twenty-one years in a house in London demised to him. The de-
fendant answered that this agreement was invalid as a restraint
on the right to work.70 Coke held for the plaintiff on the ground
that this was not a general restraint on exercising one's trade, but
one for a time and place certain.71 This ruling is neither in conflict
with the cases discussed above, nor is it difficult to explain. Un-
like a governmental restriction based on a variety of political con-
siderations, the agreement in this case was a product of private
bargaining with each side obtaining and transferring a valuable
consideration.72 Freedom of the marketplace includes the freedom
to accept limitations on one's own freedom. The case did not, how-
ever, validate a total restraint on the practice of a trade.
62 Dominus Rex v. Tooley, 80 Eng. Rep. 1055 (K.B. 1613).
63 Id.
64 Id. at 1058.
65 Id. at 1059.
66 Id. at 1057.
67 Id. at 1059.
68 Id.
69 80 Eng. Rep. 1012 (K.B. 1613).
70 Id. at 1013.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 1012-13.
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b. The King's Prerogatives and Other Restraints
The king's prerogative power was an English historical insti-
tution, which Blackstone understood to reflect "that special pre-
eminence, which the king hath, over and above all other persons,
and out of the ordinary course of the common law, in right of his
regal dignity."7 3 Professor Dicey explains: "[t]he 'prerogative' ap-
pears to be both historically and as a matter of actual fact nothing
else than the residue of discretionary or arbitrary authority,
which at any given time is legally left in the hands of the
Crown. 7 4 The king's prerogative powers in the early 1600s were
extensive. They included dominion of the sea, control over naviga-
tion, foreign affairs, defense of the realm, enforcing acts of Parlia-
ment, dispensing justice, coining money, providing for his own
household, granting offices and titles of nobility, and collecting
taxes.75 Under these powers, the king and his ministers might use
and even confiscate private property without compensation.76 To
be sure, prerogative powers and eminent domain rules and out-
comes were different.
The Case of the King's Prerogative in Saltpetre71 concerned a
claim for indemnification by a landowner because the king's em-
ployees, without payment of compensation, had dug and removed
saltpeter from his land to be used for making gunpowder. The
king contended that this action was taken in furtherance of his
prerogative powers, the exercise of which did not require parlia-
mentary assent or payment of compensation.78 The prerogative
involved in this case was defense of the realm. 9 The eight spe-
cially assembled judges, including Coke, then Chief Justice of the
Common Pleas, issued the opinion. They observed that gunpow-
der was required for the nation's defense and unfriendly foreign
powers might restrain its sale to England, jeopardizing the na-
tion's security. 0 They acknowledged the legitimacy of the prerog-
ative as applied in this case, which, wrote the justices, "ought to
be taken only by the ministers of the King... and cannot be con-
verted to any other use than for the defence of the realm."81
According to this decision, saltpeter was essential to the na-
tional defense, and consequently the king under his prerogative
73 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *232.
74 A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 420
(8th ed. 1924).
75 William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553,
562 (1972).
76 Id. at 563.
77 77 Eng. Rep. 1294 (K.B. 1606).
78 Id. at 1294-95.
79 Id. at 1295.
8o Id.
81 Id.
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powers was entitled to remove it from privately owned property
pursuant to strict rules intended to preserve intact the balance of
the estate.82 The sole deprivation to the landowner would be the
loss of the saltpeter when demanded by the king for defense of the
nation, and nothing else. The mining operations must not other-
wise damage the estate or harm the owner. Although this case is
often cited as a limitation on the right of property, this interpreta-
tion is incorrect because it concerns the king's prerogatives, which
were exempt from common law protections.
The Case of the Isle of Ely' was a case referred by the Lords of
the King's Council to the justices of the Court of Common Pleas,
concerning a decree issued by the king's commissioners of sewers.
The decree required that a new river be created on the Isle of Ely
and that repairs and replacements be made to its drainage sys-
tems, all to be paid for by fifteen towns on the isle, with each town
to pay a specified amount.8 5 The drainage systems on the isle
were not functioning well and required repairs and improve-
ments.8 6 The king appointed these commissioners to execute his
prerogative powers to drain the land by maintaining in good order
and repair pipes, sewers, and ditches.8 7
Coke's court held that the commissioners could not be given
power by the king to: (1) procure land for new drainage works
(only Parliament could authorize this); (2) create a new river and
install other improvements not essential to adequate drainage;
and (3) impose taxes upon a town instead of solely upon the per-
sons benefited by the improvements.8 The justices sought to pro-
tect the residents from being taxed for unnecessary public work or
for improvements from which they obtained no gain.89 The judi-
cial decree mandated certain requirements that were limited to
making repairs and improvements needed for the satisfactory and
safe operation of the drainage systems.90
The justices ruled that the cost of the repairs and replace-
ments should be borne only by persons that are benefited, and
then according to the quantity of their land and the portion, ten-
82 Id. at 1295-96.
83 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1056 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) (citing a book that quotes the Saltpetre case to argue that regulation during the
colonial period could deny an owner of all productive use of his property if it extended to the
public benefit; however, the quote fails to mention that it deals only with the King's prerog-
ative and does not relate to the compensation issue).
84 77 Eng. Rep. 1139 (K.B. 1610).
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 1140-42.
89 Id. at 1142.
90 Id. at 1141.
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ure or profit obtained from the improvements. 9' Imposing the
taxes on the various towns would burden persons not advantaged
by the drainage improvements, and the justices noted that "none
could be taxed towards the reparation, but those who had
prejudice, damage, or disadvantage by the said nuisances or de-
faults, and who might have benefit and profit by the reformation
or removing of them."92 While this was not a case of eminent do-
main, it confirmed a common law principle that no person should
be required to contribute more than his fair share to eliminating
or reducing public burdens. Or, as contemporary courts put it, a
property owner should not bear public burdens which, in all fair-
ness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.93
Coke's opinion in Mouse's Case9" inaugurated the law of ne-
cessity which permitted destruction of property or possessions
when such action was essential to protect lives and property. In
this case, a commercial barge carrying passengers encountered
heavy seas, and in order to save lives the defendant, who was a
passenger, threw out of the barge the plaintiffs casket containing
his valuable possessions.95 In a suit for damages, Coke's court
held that if the danger to life occurred by an act of God, without
any individual's fault, everyone ought to bear his loss without in-
demnification.9" It was proved that if the possessions had not
been thrown out of the barge, the passengers would have
drowned.9" The rule was later applied to events of actual necessity
brought about by great calamities endangering health and safety.
Thus, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,9" Justice Scalia
recognized that certain restraints on property rights (in addition
to the control of nuisances) were required "in cases of actual neces-
sity," such as to prevent the spreading of a fire or to forestall other
grave threats to the lives and property of others.99
In Bates's Case,100 the Court of Exchequer upheld the king's
power to levy duties on goods imported into England on the basis
that import duties were related to the king's prerogative to con-
duct foreign affairs and regulate foreign trade. Bates refused to
pay a duty upon the import of currants, imposed by James I, on
91 Id. at 1142.
92 Id.
93 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). See also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.4 (1987); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450
U.S. 621, 656 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978).
94 77 Eng. Rep. 1341 (K.B. 1609).
95 Id. at 1341-42.
96 Id. at 1342.
97 Id. at 1341-42.
98 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
99 Id. at 1029 n.16.
loo An Information Against Bates, 145 Eng. Rep. 267 (Ex. Ch. 1606).
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the ground that Parliament had not authorized this tax. 1 ' Coke
considered the court's decision erroneous because it violated
Chapter 30 of the Magna Carta of 1297, which provided that all
domestic and foreign merchants are entitled "to buy and sell with-
out any manner of evil tolts, by the old and rightful customs, ex-
cept in time of war."10 2 According to Coke, under the common law,
the king's prerogative was limited to imposing import or export
duties only when it was essential for the advancement of foreign
trade and traffic, "which is the life of every island."1°3 Coke wrote
that the king cannot, at his pleasure, impose duties upon imports,
stating that "the common law hath so admeasured the preroga-
tives of the king, that they should not take away, nor prejudice the
inheritance of any: and the best inheritance that the subject hath,
is the law of the realme."104 Coke thus strictly interpreted the
king's powers with respect to taxing foreign trade, contending that
his prerogative to conduct foreign affairs is limited to preserving
the nation's security.
The list that follows summarizes some of the important prin-
ciples Coke advanced either as a legal commentator or a jurist,
which have influenced jurisprudence in both England and the
United States. °5 These principles included many of the rights
Americans possessed in 1787 when the United States Constitution
was drafted, and in 1788 when it was ratified.
1. No man shall be deprived of his life, liberty and property,
including his lands, tenements, goods or chattels unless it is
done pursuant to the substantive and procedural require-
ments of due process of law. 106
2. A legislative enactment ought to be prospective, not retroac-
tive, in both text and operation. 10 7
3. Judges must adhere to and apply substantive and procedu-
ral due process of law in all legal proceedings. l 5
1o Id.
102 COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES, supra note 14, at *57.
103 Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 397 (KB. 1608).
104 COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES, supra note 14, at *63.
1o5 As is evident from the foregoing discussion, Coke utilized numerous theories to sup-
port property rights, often simply applying a general principle to this purpose. It should
not be concluded from the prior discussion, however, that Coke was dedicated to free mar-
ket economics. Historian Barbara Malament writes that he was highly selective in his
support of a free market, although he can be regarded as much more enlightened in this
respect than most of his intellectual contemporaries. According to her, Coke did not believe
in the inherent value of economic freedom: "For Coke was interested in full employment
and not efficiency; just prices and not competition. Far from searching for new economic
concepts, he drew upon the Commonwealth ideal, arguing consistently that 'trade and traf-
fique cannot be maintained or increased without order and government .... '" Barbara
Malament, The "Economic Liberalism" of Sir Edward Coke, 76 YALE L.J. 1321, 1358 (1967).
106 COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES, supra note 14, at *46-47, 50.
107 Id. at 292.
1O8 Id. at 50.
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4. When an act of Parliament is against common right and
reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the
common law will adjudge such act to be void. °9
5. Laws of the land include only general and public laws, oper-
ating equally upon every person in the community and do
not include laws intended to favor or harm certain individu-
als or groups." °
6. Regulatory laws must substantially advance the purpose for
which the government has imposed them."'
7. Exactions for public repairs and improvements should only
be imposed in proportion to the benefits received. 2
8. No person should be given the power to be a judge in his
own cause.
13
9. Every person possesses the liberty to practice the trade, oc-
cupation, or vocation of his choice." 4
10. Monopolies violate the common law." 5
11. The prerogative powers of the king must be narrowly con-
strued to give effect solely to the public benefits they are
intended to promote.1
12. Ownership of property or possessions may be limited when
it is essential to protect lives or property. 1 7
B. William Blackstone and his Commentaries
Another great English legal commentator, William Black-
stone (1723-1780), was in general accord with Coke's interpreta-
tion of the property and other economic protections of Chapter 29,
as subsequently enlarged by statute or judicial decision. He was a
justice of the Court of Common Pleas (1770-1780), and the first
Vinerian professor of English law at the Oxford University. The
legal community in North America looked to Blackstone as a lead-
ing interpreter of English law. Among these was the famous
Chancellor James Kent of New York, who acknowledged that "he
owed his reputation to the fact that, when studying law.., he had
but one book, Blackstone's Commentaries, but that one book he
mastered.""' A biographer of Blackstone states that most mem-
lo9 Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B. 1610).
11o COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES, supra note 14, at *50.
ill Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 652.
112 The Case of the Isle of Ely, 77 Eng. Rep. 1139, 1142 (K.B. 1610).
113 Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 652.
114 See, e.g., Dominus Rex v. Tooley, 80 Eng. Rep. 1055, 1055 (K-B. 1613); The Case of
the Tailors of Ipswich, 77 Eng. Rep. 1218, 1219 (K.B. 1610); The Case of Monopolies, 77
Eng. Rep. 1260, 1266 (K.B. 1602); Davenant v. Hurdis, 72 Eng. Rep. 769, 770-71 (K.B.
1598).
115 The Case of Monopolies, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1265-66.
116 See The Case of the King's Prerogative in Saltpetre, 77 Eng. Rep. 1294, 1295 (K.B.
1606).
117 See Mouse's Case, 77 Eng. Rep 1341 (K.B. 1609) (per author's own translation).
118 DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW 3 (1941) (quoting
CHARLES WARREN, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 187 (1911)).
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bers of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 "were familiar
with[,] and they were no doubt greatly influenced by[,] Black-
stone's analysis of the English governmental system."" 9 Many
terms in the Constitution were used in the same sense employed
by him.
According to Edmund Burke, the eminent English politician
and commentator of the late eighteenth century, nearly as many
of Blackstone's Commentaries (1765-1769) were sold in America
as in England. 2 ° In Hammond's Blackstone, 2' a compilation of
the original commentaries, William G. Hammond, its author,
states that in examining twenty-five hundred volumes of Ameri-
can law reports covering the period from 1787 to 1890, Blackstone
was referred to or quoted more than any other writer by various
courts in the United States.'22 William Carey Jones, the author of
Jones's Blackstone, another compilation, states that as of 1915
Blackstone had been cited and usually accepted in almost ten
thousand cases since 1784.123 As indicated in a 1999 decision,
United States Supreme Court justices refer to Blackstone as the
commentator "whose works constituted the preeminent authority
on English law for the founding generation." 24
Blackstone was an admirer of Coke and referred to him as "a
man of infinite learning in his profession," noting that Coke's writ-
ings were so highly esteemed that "these are cited [as the Insti-
tutes] without any author's name." 25 Much of Blackstone's
Commentaries repeated and explained the common law principles
Coke had set forth a century-and-a-half earlier. In one important
respect, however, many early Americans rejected Blackstone and
his position that the legislature should be the supreme branch of
government, favoring instead a government whose powers are
separated, limited and enumerated. Understandably, Black-
stone's assertion that the natural law was legally supreme was
the position in his Commentaries that the American colonists cited
most often.'26
The difference in view between Coke and Blackstone about
parliamentary supremacy may be attributable to the time when
119 DAVID A. LOCKMILLER, SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE 174 (1938).
12o Edmund Burke, Speech on Conciliation with America (Mar. 22, 1775), in THE AMER-
ICAN REVOLUTION, 1763-1783, at 154 (Richard B. Morris ed., South Carolina Press 1971)
(1970).
121 WILLIAM G. HAMMOND, HAMMOND'S BLACKSTONE, at viii-xiii (1890).
122 Id.
123 William Carey Jones, Preface to the Present Edition of 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES, at ix (William Carey Jones ed., 1915).
124 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999).
125 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *72, 73 n.t.
126 Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in Amer-
ican Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 859 (1978) (citing CLINTON RosSITER,
SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC 356, 367-68 (1953)).
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each wrote his commentaries. In Blackstone's day, this issue had
been settled in the Glorious Revolution of 1688, while it had not
been resolved in Coke's time; Blackstone's view on the "sover-
eignty of Parliament... would have amazed men of the thirteenth
century."127 Notwithstanding legislative supremacy, however,
Blackstone considered the rights of life, liberty, and property to be
"absolute."128
Blackstone stated that Chapter 29 of Henry III's 1225 Magna
Carta alone would have merited the title that it bears, "of the
great charter [because] it protected every individual of the nation
in the free enjoyment of his life, his liberty, and his property, un-
less declared to be forfeited by the judgment of his peers or the law
of the land."129 Blackstone considered the rights of life, liberty,
and property to be comprehended in the common law's protection
of the absolute rights of "personal security, of personal liberty, and
of private property."130 "For," he wrote, "the principal aim of soci-
ety is to protect individuals in the enjoyment of those absolute
rights."'3 '
Like Coke, Blackstone was also a staunch opponent of retro-
active laws. To avoid injustice, the latter wrote, people must be
aware of the laws they are expected to obey, and each law must be
"'a rule prescribed[ ' [b]ecause a bare resolution, confined in the
breast of the legislator, without manifesting itself by some exter-
nal sign, can never be properly a law. It is requisite that this reso-
lution be notified to the people who are to obey it."1 32 Clearly
rejecting retroactive laws, Blackstone stated that "[a]ll laws
should be therefore made to commence in futuro, and [those af-
fected should] be notified before their commencement."1 33
Yet Blackstone's view about retroactive laws was not wholly
accepted in American jurisprudence. The United States Constitu-
tion prohibits Congress or the states from passing ex post facto
laws,'3 but it is uncertain whether the framers intended to ban all
retroactive laws or solely what Blackstone referred to as ex post
facto laws. In Calder v. Bull,135 the United States Supreme Court
interpreted the constitutional prohibitions on ex post facto laws as
applying only to criminal laws. 136 Although the ex post facto provi-
sions are not applicable to non-criminal matters, the Supreme
127 ARTHUR R. HOGUE, ORIGINS OF THE COMMON LAW 205 (Liberty Press 1985) (1966).
128 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *125, 130, 134.
129 4 id. at *417.
130 1 id. at *140.
131 1 id. at *120.
132 1 id. at *45.
133 1 id. at *46.
134 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 10.
135 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 386 (1798).
136 Id. at 390-91.
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Court has at times applied the Due Process Clauses to strike down
retroactive property laws. 3 '
According to Blackstone, the absolute right of property "con-
sists of the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all [the owner's]
acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the
laws of the land."' a As the reader will recall, the words "law of
the land" were interpreted by Coke to mean by the due course and
"process of law," and the last expression he expounded to mean
"by indictment or presentment of good and lawfull men, where
such deeds be done in due manner.' 1 39 Blackstone states it this
way:
[Pursuant to Chapter 29 a]nd by a variety of antient statutes
[citing the three statutes of Edward III noted in section II.
supra] it is enacted, that no man's lands or goods shall be seised
into the king's hands, against the great charter, and the law of
the land; and that no man shall be disinherited, nor put out of
his franchises or freehold, unless he be duly brought to answer,
and be forejudged by course of law; and if any thing be done to
the contrary, it shall be redressed, and holden for none. 4 '
Blackstone thus reiterates and ratifies Coke's view that due pro-
cess of law is a necessary precondition to government infringe-
ment on life, liberty, or property.
These safeguards were essential to maintain the integrity of
private property, which for Blackstone meant "that sole and des-
potic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the exter-
nal things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other
individual in the universe."' When Blackstone wrote his Com-
mentaries, and at least until and including when the United
States Constitution and Bill of Rights were ratified in 1780 and
1791, respectively, the common law accorded land owners almost
total physical control of their properties. "So great moreover,"
Blackstone declared, "is the regard of the law for private property,
that it will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for
the general good of the whole community." 142 He then went on to
assert the requirement of compensation for a government acquisi-
tion of private property for public use, and subsequently the pro-
137 See BMW of N. Am. Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996) (applying the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down Alabama's punitive damages rules
and holding that BMW did not have notice of the severity of the penalty that the state may
impose); see also Andrew C. Weiler, Note, Has Due Process Struck Out? The Judicial Rub-
berstamping of Retroactive Economic Laws, 42 DUKE L.J. 1069 (discussing generally retro-
active taxation of property).
138 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134.
139 COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES, supra note 14, at *50.
140 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIEs *134-35.
141 2 id. at *2.
142 1 id. at *135.
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tection of owners offered by the laws of trespass14 and nuisance.'
While Blackstone believed in the parliamentary supremacy that
existed at the time he wrote, he also interpreted "law of the land"
to be protective of the rights of life, liberty, and property, none of
which government could rightfully limit.'45
During the periods covered by the commentaries of Coke and
Blackstone, the common law, although generally dedicated to the
protection of individual liberty, did not always support freedom of
the economic market. Blackstone reports that a number of "of-
fenses against trade" were punishable, such as the offense of fore-
stalling, regrating, engrossing, and usury.146 The major purpose of
these laws was to maintain low food prices and was not only sup-
ported by many consumers but also by holders of exclusive trade
rights who feared the economic consequences of free trade.'47 The
United States Constitution contains no provision authorizing Con-
gress to pass these laws. "Not even proposed [at the Constitu-
tional Convention] were the powers to control prices, wages,
interest rates, the quality of goods, the conditions of their sale,
and the allocation of labor."4 '
Although Blackstone writes that the principal aim of society
is to protect individuals in the enjoyment of those absolute rights
vested in them by nature, he acknowledges that in a civilized soci-
ety no person can retain the freedom of doing whatever he
pleases.'49 Political or civil liberty is therefore none other than
natural liberty "so far restrained by human laws (and no farther)
as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the
publick."15 ° As Blackstone explained:
Hence we may collect that the law, which restrains a man from
doing mischief to his fellow citizens, though it diminishes the
natural, increases the civil liberty of mankind: but every wanton
and causeless restraint of the will of the subject, whether prac-
ticed by a monarch, a nobility, or a popular assembly, is a degree
of tyranny. Nay, that even laws themselves, whether made with
or without our consent, if they regulate and constrain our con-
duct in matters of mere indifference, without any good end in
view, are laws destructive of liberty .... [Tihat constitution or
frame of government, that system of laws, is alone calculated to
maintain civil liberty, which leaves the subject entire master of
143 1 id.
144 3 id. at *209-10, 219-21.
145 1 id. at *120-41.
146 4 id. at *155.
147 4 id. at *158-59.
148 WILLIAM D. GRAMPP, ECONOMIC LIBERALISM 109 (1965).
149 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *120-21.
150 1 id. at *121.
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his own conduct, except in those points wherein the public good
requires some direction or restraint.'
Accordingly, a restraint imposed by government pursuant to this
standard would not necessarily constitute a legal deprivation in
violation of Chapter 29.
Under contemporary constitutional jurisprudence, Black-
stone's exposition takes the form of tests to determine whether the
legislative means substantially achieves the legislative ends;
whether the means and ends are legitimate; and whether when
restraint is necessary, the one utilized is the least onerous to lib-
erty.152 Thus, Chief Justice Marshall declared that for legislation
to be constitutional, the end has to be "legitimate," and the means
"appropriate" and "plainly adapted to that end." 53
IV. THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
As the subsequent discussion will explain, a major, if not the
major reason that led to the framing and ratification of the United
States Constitution, was to protect economic freedom. In 1781,
the thirteen original colonies (which, as a result of the revolution,
were no longer subject to English rule) entered into the Articles of
Confederation that established a confederation of states which
they called the United States of America. The Articles asserted
that the free inhabitants of each state were entitled to all privi-
leges and immunities of free citizens in the several states.' It
granted each state one vote in the Congress of the Confederation
and provided very limited legislative and executive powers to that
body, with each state retaining powers not expressly granted. 55
Congress had power to conduct foreign relations, establish armed
services, regulate relations with Indian Tribes, and issue and bor-
row money.' It had no power to levy taxes, regulate trade and
commerce, or otherwise interfere in the internal affairs of the
states. Amendments could only be adopted by unanimous con-
sent.157 The Articles reflected the colonists' distrust of centralized
government by rejecting it except when essential to the viability of
the Confederation.
The most serious problem confronted by the Confederation
was the prevalence in the states of economic regulations that in-
hibited both trade between the states and ownership and invest-
151 1 id. at *121-22.
152 1 id. at *75-78.
153 M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
154 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV.
155 Id. art. II.
156 Id. art. IX.
157 Id. art. XIII.
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ment within the states."' 8 The official efforts to remove these
barriers began with the Virginia General Assembly in January
1786, with its passage of a resolution proposing a meeting of com-
missioners from the states to consider and recommend "how far a
uniform system in their commercial regulations may be necessary
to their common interest and their permanent harmony."159 Com-
missioners from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
and Virginia subsequently met in September at Annapolis and
recommended a meeting of states to be held in Philadelphia in
May 1787 to consider changes in the Articles of Confederation re-
garding commerce and other important matters. 6 ° On February
21, 1787, Congress adopted resolutions calling for a convention to
be held in May at Philadelphia for the sole purpose of revising the
Articles of Confederation. 16
1
Under the Articles, each state had virtually unlimited power
to regulate all traffic and trade to and from its borders. 162 Each
state applied this power in its own self interest, frequently to the
detriment of other states.163 Organizers of the Constitutional Con-
vention of 1787 sought to suppress what Alexander Hamilton re-
ferred to as the "interfering and unneighborly regulations of some
States;" regulations which, "if not restrained by a national con-
trol" would result in even more "serious sources of animosity and
discord."" 6 A major objective was to prohibit state or municipal
laws whose purpose was to institute local economic protectionism,
that is, laws supporting their economic interests to the detriment
of other states and a national economy. 165
Laws regulating economic activity within the states were also
of great concern. Following the revolutionary war, the economies
in some states deteriorated markedly, leading to "an ignoble array
of legislative schemes for the defeat of creditors and the invasion
of contractual obligations."166 Some states passed "stay laws," ex-
tending the due date of notes, "installments laws," allowing debt-
ors to pay their obligations in installments after they had fallen
due, and "commodity payment laws," permitting payments in cer-
158 See CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 3-31 (1928).
159 Res. of the General Assemb. of Va., Jan. 21, 1786, Proposing a J. Meeting of Com-
missioners From the States To Consider and Recommend a Federal Plan For Regulating
Commerce, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 398, at 38, 38 (1927).
160 Proceedings of Commissioners to Remedy Defects of the Fed. Government, 69th
Cong. 39-43, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 398, at 39, 39-43 (1927).
161 Report of Proceedings in Congress, Wednesday, Feb. 21, 1787, reprinted in H.R.
Doc. No. 398, at 44, 46 (1927).
162 See WARREN, supra note 158, at 3-31.
163 Id.
164 THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 144 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
165 Id. at 143-44.
166 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 427 (1934).
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tain enumerated commodities at a proportion of actual value. 1 7
Some states were reluctant to pass legislation allowing the British
to collect debts owed by Americans, payment of which had been
suspended during the war. According to Alexander Hamilton,
"creditors had been ruined or in a very extensive degree much in-
jured; confidence in pecuniary transactions had been destroyed
and the springs of industry had been proportionably relaxed" be-
cause of the failure of the states to safeguard commercial rights. 68
In the 1780s, many expressed alarm about the economic via-
bility and stability of the states if they remained largely autono-
mous.169 Not only was social chaos and even violence feared, but
so were political forces that favored policies destructive of private
ownership and enterprise. According to Madison, laws infringing
on property rights "contributed more to that uneasiness which
produced the Convention... than those which accrued.., from
the inadequacy of the Confederation." 170 To the same effect, John
Marshall-who later became Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court-observed during the ratification debates that the Confed-
eration took away "the incitements to industry, by rendering prop-
erty insecure and unprotected." 171 "The Constitution, on the
contrary, 'will promote and encourage industry.' ' 172
Marshall explained in an opinion he later wrote as Chief Jus-
tice that the union of the states was intended to create one com-
mercial market, and that "so far as respects the
intercommunication of individuals, the lines of separation be-
tween states are, in many respects, obliterated."173 In dramatic
terms, he described the creditor-debtor problems as a critical rea-
son for creating a national government:
The power of changing the relative situation of debtor and credi-
tor, of interfering with contracts, a power which comes home to
every man, touches the interest of all, and controls the conduct
of every individual in those things which he supposes to be
proper for his own exclusive management, had been used to
such an excess by the state legislatures, as to break in upon the
ordinary intercourse of society, and destroy all confidence be-
tween man and man. The mischief had become so- great, so
alarming, as not only to impair commercial intercourse, and
threaten the existence of credit, but to sap the morals of the peo-
167 Id. at 458 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
168 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE EXAMINATION No. V (1801), reprinted in 25 THE PAPERS
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 479 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., 1977).
169 See WARREN, supra note 158.
17o Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), reprinted in 10
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 206, 212 (Robert A. Rutland, et al. eds., 1977).
171 1 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 417 (1916).
172 1 id.
173 Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 334 (1827) (4-3 decision) (Marshall,
C.J., dissenting).
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ple, and destroy the sanctity of private faith. To guard against
the continuance of the evil was an object of deep interest with
all the truly wise, as well as the virtuous of this great commu-
nity, and was one of the important benefits expected from a re-
form of the government.174
For Marshall, a government that privileged economic liberties was
a highly acceptable paradigm.
During the Convention, Madison said that the Union must
"[provide] more effectually for the security of private rights, and
the steady dispensation of Justice."17 He asked: "Was it to be sup-
posed that republican liberty could long exist under the abuses of
it practised in [some ofi the States[?]"1 76 The Pennsylvania Packet
described the situation in 1786: "At the commencement of the
Revolution, it was supposed that what is called the executive part
of government was the only dangerous part; but we see now that
quite as much mischief, if not more, may be done, and as much
arbitrary conduct acted, by a legislature."177
Whoever was in financial distress, it seemed-whether the
small farmer, large planter, or merchant-sought and frequently
obtained political aid to overcome his problems. Some used the
process to acquire greater riches. Such a political climate was de-
structive to ownership and investment. Understandably, as Al-
bert Beveridge, John Marshall's biographer, concluded, the
"determination of commercial and financial interests to get some
plan adopted under which business could be transacted, was the
most effective force that brought about [the Philadelphia
Convention]."17R
Although the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was con-
vened to amend the Articles of Confederation, the Convention
chose instead to frame an entirely new document which still gov-
erns this nation. For its day, this Constitution was a unique docu-
ment. No nation had ever adopted a constitution separating
government into three branches, substantially limiting the powers
of each branch, and giving each partial or total veto powers over
each of the other two branches.179
174 Id. at 354-55.
175 James Madison, Comments at the Federal Convention of 1787 (June 6, 1787), in 1
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 29, 134 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
[hereinafter Comments at the Federal Convention].
176 Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 as Reported by James Madison, in THE
MAKING OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: THE GREAT DOCUMENTS, 1774-1779, at 109, 162
(Charles Callan Tansill ed., 1972).
177 Isaac Kramnick, Introduction to THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 27 (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
Penguin Classics 1987).
178 BEVERIDGE, supra note 171, at 242.
179 See RONALD L. WATTS, COMPARING FEDERAL SYSTEMS 2-3 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing
the existence of nations with federalism prior to the United States but without the limiting
powers of different branches of government).
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The original Constitution of 1787 granted limited powers to
each of the three branches of government and contained very few
specific restrictions on the nation's powers*18° The federal govern-
ment was limited in power so that it could not deprive citizens of
their privileges and immunities, suspend the writ of habeas
corpus, levy general capitation or other direct taxes, or pass bills
of attainder and ex post facto laws; jury trials were required in all
criminal matters, treason was defined and its punishment pre-
scribed; and no religious test was required as a qualification for
any office under the United States government. 8'
The Constitution was passed by delegates who had lived
under and were steeped in the common law. Most terms and pro-
visions of the Constitution are of common law origin and cannot
fully be understood without reference to the common law. Thus,
although there were no specific protections for the right of prop-
erty or economic activity or press and speech, the United States
government was given no power in the Constitution to deprive
people of these common law rights. There was therefore no need
for specific protections of such liberties and the Constitutional
Convention voted not to include a bill of rights in the document.' 82
A bill of rights was subsequently appended largely to allay fears
that the United States government might some day seek to apply
powers that had not been delegated.' 83
Accordingly, the United States government, at the time the
Constitution was ratified, had no power to deprive people of their
common law rights, as generally described in the writings of Coke,
Blackstone, and other credible legal commentators. As Alexander
Hamilton explained in The Federalist Papers No. 84, "[hlere, [un-
like in England], the people surrender nothing; and as they retain
everything they have no need of particular reservations.""
Therefore, a bill of rights was superfluous. As Hamilton aptly
questioned, "For why declare that things shall not be done which
there is no power to do?" 85
For over three years, between the ratification of the original
Constitution on June 21, 1788, and the Bill of Rights on December
15, 1791, Americans lived under a Constitution that enumerated
relatively few rights against the national government. Three
18o See U.S. CONST. arts. I-III.
181 Id. art. I, § 9, cls. 2-4; id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; id. art. III, § 3, cls. 1-2; id. art. IV, § 2,
cl. 1; id. art. VI, cl. 3.
182 See ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791, at
106-25 (Northeastern Univ. Press 1991) (1955).
183 Id. at 190-218.
184 THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
185 Id.
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states initially refused to ratify the proposed Bill of Rights." 6 The
debate about the Bill of Rights did not resonate with the American
public. The absence of this constitutional protection was not con-
sidered a matter of vital concern. Americans seemed confident
that they were protected under the original Constitution against
any excesses or oppressions that the federal government might
contemplate.
What were the "rights of Englishmen" that these Americans
treasured as their birthright and believed were indelibly secured
in the Constitution and Bill of Rights? England has no written
constitution but, wrote United States Supreme Court Justice Jo-
seph Bradley in 1872, "[t]he people of this country brought with
them to its shores the rights of Englishmen; the rights which had
been wrested from English sovereigns at various periods of the
nation's history."187 These migrants, explained Justice John
Harlan in 1884, "brought with them, as their inheritance, which
no government could rightfully impair or destroy, certain guaran-
ties of the rights of life and liberty and property, which had long
been deemed fundamental in Anglo-Saxon institutions. "
188
Early American courts (both federal and state) frequently uti-
lized the commentaries of Coke and Blackstone to resolve conflicts
between the government and the people. To be sure, the Ameri-
cans had severed their political bonds with England, but not their
reliance on its common law. For many Americans, these sources
constituted an unwritten English Constitution that secured a
large measure of human freedom. As historian Gordon S. Wood
has put it, "what made their Revolution seem so unusual... [was
that] they revolted not against the English constitution but on be-
half of it."'
The legal commentaries of Coke and Blackstone concerning
protection of material rights greatly influenced jurisprudence in
the United States. Jurists often cited both in their opinions.. Even
when not cited, doctrines attributable to these great English com-
mentators were evident in legal opinions of federal and state
courts. With respect to United States jurisprudence between the
ratification of the Constitution in 1788, and ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, the judiciary frequently accorded
186 STATE CONVENTIONS, RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE SEVERAL STATES,
ARRANGED IN THE ORDER OF THEIR RATIFICATION, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 398, at 1024 n.9
(1927) (noting that New Hampshire's ratification on June 21, 1788 in accordance with Arti-
cle VII of the constitution, "became binding upon the nine states that had previously rati-
fied it."); H.R. CON. RES., 1ST CONG., RES. OF THE FIRST CONGRESS SUBMITTING TWELVE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 398, at 1065 n.2 (1927) (not-
ing that Massachusetts, Connecticut and Georgia did not make returns of the resolution).
187 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 114 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
188 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 539 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
189 GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 10
(1969).
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protection for property rights commensurate with the rules ex-
pressed by these Englishmen.
The ratification arguments over the protection of freedom of
the press provide an illustration of powers that the judiciary could
exercise in securing liberties. Hamilton wrote in The Federalist
Papers No. 84 that there was no need to be concerned about secur-
ing freedom of the press, inasmuch as the Constitution does not
grant the government any power to restrain it. 190 Does this mean,
then, that as far as the national government is concerned, freedom
of the press is absolute, and not subject to any restraint? James
Wilson, a Framer of the Constitution and later a Supreme Court
Justice, explained during the ratification debates that freedom of
the press was not subject to the powers of government under the
common law, which were then considerable. 191 In other words, the
national government had no power to diminish freedom of the
press as the term was defined under the common law. 9 2 However,
the national government could still penalize criminal libel, which
the common law did not protect. 9 3 Thus, in 1907 in Patterson v.
Colorado,9 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes held that the common
law definition of speech and press applied to the interpretation of
expression guarantees of the United States Constitution. Holmes
wrote that:
the main purpose of such constitutional provisions is "to prevent
all such previous restraints upon publications as had been prac-
tised by other governments," and they do not prevent the subse-
quent punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to the
public welfare (citations omitted). The preliminary freedom ex-
tends as well to the false as to the true: the subsequent punish-
ment may extend as well to the true as to the false. This was
the law of criminal libel apart from statute in most cases, if not
in all. 19
5
In Schenck v. United States,'96 Holmes changed his interpre-
tation of the expression guarantees and urged in dictum the adop-
tion of the clear and present danger test, a much stronger
protection than the common law offered, which the Court subse-
190 THE FEDERALIST No. 84, supra note 184, at 513-14.
191 James Wilson's Speech in the State House Yard, Philadelphia, 6 October (1787), in
2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 167, 167-68
(1976).
192 James Wilson, Speech in the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 1, 1787), reprinted in 1
PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788, at 204, 308 (John Bach Mc-
Master & Frederick D. Stone eds., 1970) (1888).
193 Id. at 308-09.
194 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
195 Id. at 462 (citations omitted).
196 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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quently accepted.'97 Applying his new test, Holmes asserted that
"[t]he question in every case [challenging a restriction on expres-
sion] is whether the words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has
a right to prevent."'98 This test also had its origin in the common
law. As previously set forth, Blackstone wrote that a "wanton and
causeless restraint" is a "degree of tyranny."'99 Hence, a law re-
straining advocacy of conduct on the basis that it will cause vio-
lence, when it is not likely to cause such violence, is futile and
oppressive to the people who are restricted.
As of 1964, almost every state applied the common law of libel
to determine liability for false publication. Until that time, a state
law governing libel was not subject to the First Amendment. In a
series of decisions beginning in that year, the United States Su-
preme Court federalized major aspects of libel law.200
Madison explained that the common law protected activities
of the people. In The Federalist Papers No. 44, he asserted that
"[b]ills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the ob-
ligation of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the so-
cial compact and to every principle of sound legislation."2 1 "Very
properly, therefore" did the Constitutional Convention include
these protections in the original Constitution.202 Hamilton
presented such a position with respect to a statute revoking a land
grant procured by fraud that was purchased by a bona fide buyer,
which were the facts in the famous case of Fletcher v. Peck.2 °3
Hamilton contended that the common law governed in the absence
of constitutional requirements to the contrary:
Without pretending to judge of the original merits or demerits of
the purchasers, it may be safely said to be a contravention of the
first principles of natural justice and social policy, without any
judicial decision of facts, by a positive act of the legislature, to
revoke a grant of property regularly made for valuable consider-
ation, under legislative authority, to the prejudice even of third
persons on every supposition innocent of the alleged fraud or
corruption.0 4
197 Id. at 52. See, e.g., Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v. United
States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
198 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
199 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *122.
200 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964).
201 THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 282 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
202 Id.
203 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
204 BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 22
(1938) (quoting Alexander Hamilton) (The opinion related to the matter subsequently liti-
gated in Fletcher.).
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The famous jurist and scholar James Kent explained:
It was not to be doubted that the constitution and laws of the
United States were made in reference to the existence of the
common law .... In many cases, the language of the constitu-
tion and laws would be inexplicable without reference to the
common law; and the existence of the common law is not only
supposed by the constitution, but it is appealed to for the con-
struction and interpretation of its powers. °5
Kent applied this interpretation of the common law in his role
as Chancellor of the New York Court of Chancery. In 1816, in the
widely quoted case of Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, °6 after as-
serting that to divert or obstruct a watercourse is a private nui-
sance at common law, subject to remedy by injunctive relief,
Chancellor Kent elevated an aggrieved owner's common law
rights to constitutional status. 07 Combining the common law
rules of eminent domain and nuisance, he reasoned that a govern-
ment improvement supplying the village residents with water,
which diverted water from flowing over the plaintiffs land, had
violated his due process rights by depriving him of his property
because the stream of water was part of his freehold. °5
Relying on Blackstone, eminent European legal commenta-
tors, and English cases, Kent asserted that the payment of com-
pensation "is a necessary qualification accompanying the exercise
of legislative power, in taking private property for public uses."2 °9
Although this case arose in New York whose constitution then
contained no Just Compensation Clause,210 Kent held the statute
at issue was invalid unless it was amended or interpreted to pro-
vide for compensation to indemnify the owner for his loss. Kent
stated "I feel myself, therefore, not only authorized, but bound to
conclude, that a provision for compensation is an indispensable
attendant on the due and constitutional exercise of the power of
depriving an individual of his property."211
While state courts varied on subscribing to Gardner, as of
1870 the United States Supreme Court was clearly supportive of
Kent's position, as disclosed in Yates v. Milwaukee 12 decided that
year and Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.213 decided the following year.
In Yates, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld Yates's common
205 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 315-16 (Da Capo Press 1971)
(1826).
206 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816).
207 Id. at 164-66.
208 Id. at 166-67.
209 Id. at 166.
210 Id. at 167.
211 Id. at 168.
212 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497 (1870).
213 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
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law right as a riparian property owner to construct a wharf ex-
tending from the front of his lot on the bank of a river to the edge
of a navigable stream despite Milwaukee's adoption of an ordi-
nance declaring this wharf to be a nuisance because it obstructed
river traffic.214 The Court ruled that for the city to prevail it would
have to provide compensation to Yates.215 In Pumpelly, Wisconsin
authorized the construction of a dam which caused the water level
of a lake to rise, inundating Pumpelly's fields.21 Construing Wis-
consin's Takings Clause, which was similar to that in the United
States Constitution, the Supreme Court again unanimously held
that a taking had occurred requiring payment of compensation.217
The court cited as support Gardner and the New Jersey case of
Sinnickson v. Johnson,18 which also relied in part on Gardner.
219
The common law thus significantly informed the judiciary's inter-
pretation of constitutional guarantees.
There were also many instances when the common law deter-
mined the meaning of Congressional legislation. A noteworthy ex-
ample is provided by antitrust regulation. In his dissenting
opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases,22 ° Justice Bradley asserted
that the granting of monopolies was regarded at common law as
an invasion of the right of others to choose a lawful calling and
consequently made the grant of such privileges illegal.221 Many
years later, Senator John Sherman, the author of the famous anti-
trust law bearing his name, confirmed Bradley's observation; the
law he proposed was not intended to destroy all combinations "but
all those which the common law had always condemned as unlaw-
ful."222 A considerable amount of opposition to the Sherman Act
came from lawyers who believed that the Act was unnecessary
since the common law would itself achieve the objectives of the
proposed statute.223
Indeed as Alexander Hamilton put it in The Federalist Papers
No. 84, the United States Constitution was a bill of rights. It did
not grant the national government any power to deprive the peo-
ple of their common law rights. In Hamilton's opinion, expressed
214 Yates, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 507.
215 Id.
216 Pumpelly, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 175-76.
217 Id. at 174, 182.
218 17 N.J.L. 129 (N.J. 1839) (holding that New Jersey cannot abrogate right to com-
pensation for a taking, and noting that "statutes in derogation of common law rights, are to
be strictly construed"). Id. at 144.
219 Id. at 139.
220 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
221 Id. at 111, 119-21 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
222 WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 91 (Random House, Inc. 1965) (1954) (quoting Senator Sherman's
statement to the 21st Congress in 1890).
223 Id. at 77-78.
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after the Convention, "the Constitution is itself, in every rational
sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS," pre-
scribing the limits of governmental authority.1
4
In the ratification debates, the Federalists pointed out that
the constitutional text itself showed that the authority of the na-
tional government was limited. If the national legislature was to
be all powerful, they asked, why does Article I, Section 8 carefully
spell out the powers of Congress? They denied that the Necessary
and Proper Clause at the end of Section 8 was open ended, or that
it modified the severe limitations on Congress previously ex-
pressed. Accounts of the Constitutional Convention show the
Framers engaged in extensive and sometimes vitriolic debate on
whether certain powers should be authorized.225 These exercises
would have been without purpose had Congress enjoyed broad,
undefined powers.
The delegates actually turned down an effort to give Congress
immense powers. The Committee of Detail recommended that
Congress be given the sweeping power to provide "for the well
managing and securing the common property and general inter-
ests and welfare of the United States," but this proposal did not
appear in any drafts of the Constitution.226 The Convention re-
fused to empower the national government to act in many areas:
to set up temporary governments in new states; to grant charters
of incorporation; to create seminaries for the promotion of litera-
ture and the arts; to establish public institutions; to issue rewards
and immunities for the promotion of agriculture, commerce,
trades, and manufactures; to regulate stages on the post road; to
establish a university; to encourage, by property premiums and
provisions, the advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries;
to provide for opening and establishing canals; to emit bills of
credit (which then meant printing unbacked paper for circulation
as currency); and to make sumptuary laws. Each of these propos-
als was introduced, and was either voted down or not further con-
sidered outside of the committee.227 In sum, the Framers
privileged common law rights and rejected the idea that the na-
tional government would have broad power to infringe on these
rights.
224 THE FEDERALIST No. 84, supra note 184, at 515.
225 CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL CONVENTION, MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787, at 254-64 (1966). Three prominent dele-
gates refused to sign the Constitution for a variety of reasons, including their concern
about powers of the central government. The author quotes James Madison as listing Mr.
Randolph, Mr. Mason, and Mr. Gerry as "declin[ing] [to give the Constitution] the sanction
of their names." Id. at 263.
226 IRVING BRANT, THE FOURTH PRESIDENT: A LIFE OF JAMES MADISON 186 (1970). See
also BOWEN, supra note 225.
227 See BRANT, supra note 226, at 181-89.
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A. Common Law Interpretations of the Due Process Clauses
By 1868, three-quarters of the states had ratified the Four-
teenth Amendment, making it a binding document.228 Section 1
contains broad guarantees for liberties in the states, as secured by
the Privileges and Immunities, Due Process, and Equal Protection
Clauses. 229 The language of each of these clauses is comprehen-
sive and embodies the meanings previously accorded these con-
cepts by the American and English judiciary. The importance of
judicial precedent in construing the Clauses is evident from the
debates of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, which framed the amend-
ment in 1866. Representative John Bingham of Ohio was the
principal author of the protective Clauses of Section 1 of the Four-
teenth Amendment.23 ° When asked about the meaning of "due
process of law," he replied: "[T]he courts have settled that long
ago, and the gentleman can go and read their decisions."231 Sena-
tor Jacob Howard introduced in the Senate the legislation creat-
ing the Fourteenth Amendment and stated that prior judicial
interpretations of the meaning of privileges and immunities give
"some intimation of what probably will be the opinion of the
judiciary."23 2
The common law provided meaning for the Due Process of
Law clauses that are contained in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution. When the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was framed, the Constitution of the United States and the
constitutions of most states contained a Due Process or Law of the
Land Clause, with both intended to have the same meaning.233
Under the rule of stare decisis, only the decisions in which the
United States Supreme Court construed the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause are relevant to ascertaining the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. During the
years when the Fourteenth Amendment was framed and ratified
(1866 and 1868), any judge, lawyer, or private individual who
wanted to know the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment would have to read and be guided by Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., decided unanimously
by the Supreme Court in 1856.234
228 HANNIs TAYLOR, THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION app. XX
at 644 n.2 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1998) (1911).
229 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
230 See HOWARD N. MEYER, THE AMENDMENT THAT REFUSED TO DIE: EQUALITY AND JUS-
TICE DEFERRED, THE HISTORY OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 58 (Madison Books 2000)
(1973).
231 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866).
232 Id. at 2765.
233 Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276
(1856).
234 Id. at 272, 274.
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The case was actually about an exception to the due process
concept. It concerned the constitutional validity of a law granting
officers of the United States Treasury the power to enforce with-
out recourse to judicial proceedings payment of delinquencies they
found in the account of a collector of Customs." 5 The United
States Supreme Court denied the Collector's claim that he had
been deprived of due process of law.236 According to the Court, the
process employed by the treasury officers did not differ in princi-
ple from those employed in England from the time of the Magna
Carta and in many of the states at the time the Constitution was
framed.237 In passing the law the Court reasoned Congress was in
part exercising its legislative powers with respect to the collection
of taxes and was not limited by the requirements of due process.235
The Court then held that due process of law meant the same
as law of the land, and went on to construe the meaning of due
231process.  Murray's Lessee was not an isolated decision on the
meaning of due process; it generally conformed to most jurispru-
dence in the state courts. In that case, the Court's interpretation
of the due process guarantee was based on an impressive list of
authorities which it cited: Coke's Institutes of the Laws of En-
gland;24 ° Greene v. Briggs,24' a Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
decision; and five state high court decisions, Hoke v. Henderson
242
from North Carolina; Taylor v. Porter2l from New York; Vanzant
v. Waddel,244 Bank of the State v. Cooper,245 and Jones' Heirs v.
Perry246 from Tennessee. The circuit court and the five state cases
also relied on Coke.
Justice Curtis wrote the opinion in Murray's Lessee,247 and
confirmed that the rights of Americans included those accorded
protections by the common and statutory law in England when
the Constitution was framed.248 With respect to due process, the
sources of these rights were the "settled usages and modes of pro-
ceeding," that were then extant in England.249 He conditioned the
acceptance of these English rights in America to those "shown not
235 Id. at 275-76.
236 Id. at 275.
237 Id. at 276.
238 Id. at 274-75.
239 Id. at 276-77.
240 1 COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES, supra note 15.
241 10 F. Cas. 1135 (C.C.D. R.I. 1852) (No. 5,764).
242 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 1 (1833).
243 4 Hill 140 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843).
244 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 260 (1829).
245 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 599 (1831).
246 18 Tenn. (10 Yer.) 59 (1836).
247 Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 274
(1856).
248 Id. at 276.
249 Id. at 277.
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to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition by hav-
ing been acted on by them after the settlement of this country,"250
a qualification which meets the common law requirement that
laws be of "common right and reason." If prior to the framing of
the Constitution these English distinctions had been rejected in
America, they surely should not have been secured in the
Constitution.
The opinions in all six cases that Curtis cited are based on
interpretations of English common law. Each sets forth substan-
tive rights of property owners consistent with views expressed by
Coke and Blackstone. The courts in the said six cases together
entered opinions that applied due process or law of the land to
strike down a considerable amount of legislation. Hoke v. Hender-
son 251 threw out a law that deprived an elected officeholder of his
position during a prescribed term of office because there was no
judicial finding that he had violated an existing law warranting
such action.252 Taylor v. Porter25' invalidated a law for the crea-
tion of private roads because due process prohibited a forced
transfer of property from one private person to another private
person even when payment of compensation was made.254 To be
constitutionally valid, the transfer must be for a public purpose
and just compensation must be paid. An owner cannot otherwise
be deprived of his property unless he had engaged in wrongdoing
that required a forfeiture. Greene v. Briggs255 voided a law that
made a trial by jury in a criminal case dependent on the accused
person giving a bond, with surety for the payment of penalty and
court costs. 2 6 The court held that a legislature could not deprive
an accused of a right essential to prove his innocence. 57
The three Tennessee courts cited in Murray's Lessee cited
Coke's interpretation of the Magna Carta as requiring that every
law must be a general public law, operating equally upon all mem-
bers of the community. In State Bank v. Cooper,25' a Tennessee
act created a special tribunal, composed of existing judges, for the
disposition of lawsuits commenced by a named bank against its
officers, their sureties, and customers of the bank who had
overchecked, and from whose decision there was no appeal.2 59 The
Supreme Court of Tennessee held this provision to be unconstitu-
250 Id.
251 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 1 (1833).
252 Id. at 16.
253 4 Hill 140 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843).
254 Id. at 147-48.
255 10 F. Cas. 1135 (C.C.D. R.I. 1852) (No. 5,764).
256 Id. at 1141.
257 Id. at 1140.
258 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 599 (1831).
259 Id. at 605-08, 615, 621-23.
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tional as special legislation in violation of the state constitution's
Law of the Land Clause.26 ° In Jones' Heirs v. Perry,261 the Tennes-
see Supreme Court held invalid a private act passed upon applica-
tion of court appointed guardians of infants, authorizing the
guardians to sell land inherited from the parent to pay his
debts.262 In Vanzant v. Waddel,2 63 however, the court upheld a law
authorizing a holder of the notes of two named banks, at their
election, to summon persons as garnishees when the original writ
was issued against the bank, instead of waiting until the judg-
ment is recovered as in ordinary cases.26 The Court found that
the Act did not deprive the garnishees of an existing right.265
Each of these six cases was based in part on Coke's interpre-
tation of the Magna Carta that prohibited termination of an ex-
isting right without either due process of law or in violation of the
law of the land. The variety of rights protected in these cases dis-
closes the wide coverage of the due process of law concept and its
general applicability for securing liberty. Although the United
States Supreme Court refers to the Due Process clauses as "pro-
cess" and "proceeding" in its Murray's Lessee opinion,266 the cases
reported relate to substantive and procedural due process, as is
evident from its citation of both substantive267 and procedural
261
due process. According to the Court, due process of law means the
same as law of the land, which Coke interpreted as a general pro-
tection against governmental oppression.269
Accordingly, due process of law as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court in the period when the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was ratified, shields persons from laws depriving them of
their rights. In all but one of the cases, a state supreme court or a
federal appeals court upheld the aggrieved person's complaint
that he had been deprived of liberty or property without any find-
ing of wrongdoing. In the sixth case, Vanzant, the Tennessee Su-
preme Court agreed that this was the law but found it
unnecessary to apply it in the case.27°
260 Id.
261 18 Tenn. (10 Yer.) 59 (1836).
262 Id. at 69, 78.
263 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 260 (1829).
264 Id. at 269, 271.
265 Id. at 271.
266 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 274-87 (1856).
267 Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140, 147-48 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843); Hoke v. Henderson, 15
N.C. (4 Dev.) 1, 16 (1833); Jones' Heirs v. Perry, 18 Tenn. (10 Yer.) 59, 69, 83-84 (1836);
Bank of the State v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 599, 599-600 (1831); Vanzant v. Waddel, 10
Tenn. (2 Yer.) 260, 269, 271 (1829).
268 Greene v. Briggs, 10 F. Cas. 1135, 1141-44 (C.C.D. R.I. 1852) (No. 5,764).
269 Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276
(1856).
270 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) at 271.
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The Due Process Clause or Law of the Land Clause each
served an important role in American jurisprudence prior to the
Civil War. Consider in this respect some of the reasoning of the
high courts in the previously discussed cases cited in Murray's
Lessee.27' In Taylor v. Porter,272 Judge Bronson held:
The words "due process of law," in this place, cannot mean less
than a prosecution or suit instituted and conducted according to
the prescribed forms and solemnities for ascertaining guilt, or
determining the title to property. It will be seen that the same
measure of protection against legislative encroachment is ex-
tended to life, liberty and property; and if the latter can be
taken without a forensic trial and judgment, there is no security
for the others. If the legislature can take the property of A. and
transfer it to B., they can take A. himself, and either shut him
up in prison, or put him to death. But none of these things can
be done by mere legislation. There must be "due process of
law."273
In Hoke v. Henderson,274 Chief Justice Ruffin stated:
Those terms "law of the land" do not mean merely an act of the
General Assembly. If they did, every restriction upon the legis-
lative authority would be at once abrogated. For what more can
the citizen suffer, than to be "taken, imprisoned, disseized of his
freehold, liberties and privileges; be outlawed, exiled and de-
stroyed; and be deprived of his property, his liberty and his life,"
without crime? ... In reference to the infliction of punishment
and divesting of the rights of property, it has been repeatedly
held in this State, and it is believed, in every other of the Union,
that there are limitations upon the legislative power, notwith-
standing those words; and that the clause itself means that such
legislative acts, as profess in themselves directly to punish per-
sons or to deprive the citizen of his property, without trial before
the judicial tribunals, and a decision upon the matter of right,
as determined by the laws under which it vested, according to
the course, mode and usages of the common law as derived from
our forefathers, are not effectually "laws of the land," for those
purposes.275
In Greene v. Briggs,276 United States Supreme Court Justice
Benjamin Curtis (sitting as circuit justice) explained:
Natural right requires that no man should be punished for an
offence, until he has had a trial, and been proved to be guilty;
and a law which should provide for the infliction of punishment,
upon a mere accusation, without any trial, if the accused should
271 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
272 4 Hill 140 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843).
273 Id. at 147.
274 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 1 (1833).
275 Id. at 13-14.
276 10 F. Cas. 1135 (C.C.D. R.I. 1852) (No. 5,764).
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fail to furnish two sureties to pay the penalty which might, after
the trial, be adjudged against him, would be viewed, by all just
minds, as tyrannical; for it would treat the innocent, who are
unable to furnish the required security, as if they were guilty,
and would punish them, while still presumed innocent, for their
poverty, or want of friends. And it is equally clear, that such a
law would not be "the law of the land," within the settled mean-
ing of that important clause in the constitution. Certainly this
does not mean any act which the assembly may choose to pass.
If it did, the legislative will could inflict a forfeiture of life, lib-
erty, or property, without a trial. The exposition of these words,
as they stand in Magna Charta, as well as in the American con-
stitutions, has been, that they require "due process of law;" and
in this is necessarily implied and included the right to answer to
and contest the charge, and the consequent right to be dis-
charged from it, unless it is proved. 7
Judge John Catron, later appointed a justice of the United
States Supreme Court, wrote in his concurring opinion in Vanzant
that:
The clause "LAw OF THE LAND," means a general and public law,
equally binding upon every member of the community.... The
right to life, liberty and property, of every individual, must
stand or fall by the same rule or law that governs every other
member of the body politic, or "LAND," under similar circum-
stances; and every partial or private law, which directly pro-
poses to destroy or affect individual rights, or does the same
thing by affording remedies leading to similar consequences, is
unconstitutional and void. Were this otherwise, odious individ-
uals and corporate bodies, would be governed by one rule, and
the mass of the community who made the law, by another. The
idea of a people through their representatives, making laws
whereby are swept away the life, liberty and property of one or a
few citizens, by which neither the representatives nor their
other constituents are willing to be bound, is too odious to be
tolerated in any government where freedom has a name.2 78
Similarly, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment also
sought great protection of life, liberty, and property. Considering
the substance of the debates in the Thirty-Ninth Congress,
279
which framed the Fourteenth Amendment, I conclude that most of
its members sought to remove the power of the states to oppress
law-abiding persons. The Congressmen believed the most effec-
tive tool for this purpose was the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 280 They thought that both
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
277 Id. at 1140.
278 Vanzant v. Waddel, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 260, 270-71 (1829) (Catron, C.J., concurring).
279 See supra notes 230-32 and accompanying text.
280 See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
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Amendment also served this purpose but to a somewhat lesser de-
gree. As it happens, the United States Supreme Court largely de-
stroyed the Privileges and Immunities Clause in the Slaughter-
House Cases,2sl leaving the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses to secure liberties in the states.
B. James Madison's View of Government and Property Rights
The most influential Framer of both the United States Consti-
tution and the Bill of Rights was James Madison, a delegate to the
Constitutional Convention from Virginia and later a member of
the First Congress.282 He spent considerable time preparing for
the Convention by studying the writings of leading authorities on
government, particularly the Scottish philosopher and historian
David Hume, who advocated freedom for commerce as essential to
the viability and progress of a nation.2' As a result of his three
years experience as a Virginia legislator, and his extensive review
of literature on the subject of government, Madison concluded that
for a nation to be politically and economically successful consider-
able limitation of government powers was required, enabling the
productive, inventive, and competitive talents of the people to
flourish.2 4 He believed that the welfare of a nation mandated the
creation of a commercial republic that would depend on freedom of
the markets and not on the authority of the state.2 ' He was very
critical of legislators.288 Far from being dedicated to the public
good, he believed most legislators were pursuing their own politi-
cal and financial interests.8 7 Unhappily, he lamented, men seek
public office to achieve ambition, personal interest or public
good.
288
Hence the candidates who feel them, particularly, the second,
are most industrious, and most successful in pursuing their ob-
281 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74-80 (1873) (clarifying that "privileges and immunities" in
the Constitution refers only to federal privileges and immunities, not to those of the indi-
vidual states, thus greatly diluting its perceived reach). See also BERNARD H. SIEGAN,
PROPERTY RIGHTS: FROM THE MAGNA CARTA TO THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 261-67 (2001)
(discussing the Slaughter-House Cases and their effect on the "privileges and immunities"
Clause).
282 BRANT, supra note 226, at 138, 222-25.
283 DOUGLASS ADAIR, "That Politics May be Reduced to a Science": David Hume, James
Madison, and the Tenth Federalist, in FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 132, 138, 148,
150-51 (Trevor Colbourn ed., Liberty Fund, Inc. 1998) (1974). The author analyzes James
Madison's writings and demonstrates that the source of some of James Madison's political
philosophies was David Hume.
284 Id. at 150-51.
285 Id. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 81 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
286 James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787), in 1
THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 166, 167-69 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
287 1 id. at 168-69.
288 1 id. at 168.
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ject: and forming often a majority in the legislative Councils,
with interested views, contrary to the interest, and views, of
their Constituents, join in a perfidious sacrifice of the latter to
the former. A succeeding election it might be supposed, would
displace the offenders, and repair the mischief. But how easily
are base and selfish measures, masked by pretexts of public
good and apparent expediency? How frequently will a repetition
of the same arts and industry which succeeded in the first in-
stance, again prevail on the unwary to misplace their
confidence?
How frequently too will the honest but unenlightened represen-
tative be the dupe of a favorite leader, veiling his selfish views
under the professions of public good, and varnishing his sophis-
tical arguments with the glowing colours of popular
eloquence?2
89
Madison was understandably critical of pure democracies because
they rendered personal and property rights precarious:
A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt
by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert results
from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check
the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious
individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been
spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found
incompatible with personal security or the rights of property;
and have in general been as short in their lives as they have
been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have pa-
tronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed
that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political
rights, they would at the same time be perfectly equalized and
assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their
passions.290
In a subsequent essay, he viewed these inherent problems of rep-
resentative government as especially perilous in times of public
instability because:
[of] the unreasonable advantage it gives to the sagacious, the
enterprising, and the moneyed few over the industrious and uni-
formed mass of the people. Every new regulation concerning
commerce or revenue, or in any manner affecting the value of
the different species of property, presents a new harvest to those
who watch the change, and can trace its consequences; a har-
vest, reared not by themselves, but by the toils and cares of the
great body of their fellow-citizens. This is a state of things in
which it may be said with some truth that laws are made for the
few, not for the many.29 '
289 1 id. at 168-69.
290 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 285, at 81.
291 THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 381 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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As can be gleaned from his views on government, Madison
showed particular interest in the protection of property rights. In
an essay in the National Gazette of March 29, 1792, Madison of-
fered two meanings for property.292 The first was-and here he
paraphrased Blackstone-"that domination which one man claims
and exercises over the external things of the world, in exclusion of
every other individual," while the second "embraces every thing to
which a man may attach a value and have a right; and which
leaves to every one else the like advantages."293 Thus, "a man's
land, or merchandize, or money is called his property."294 A man
also has property in his opinions, religious beliefs, safety and lib-
erty of his person. "In a word, as a man is said to have a right to
his property, he may be equally said to have a property in his
rights."295
"Government is instituted," he wrote, "to protect property of
every sort.., that which lies in the various rights of individuals,"
as well as that which refers to his material possessions. 296 "This
being the end of government, that alone is a just government,
which impartially secures to every man, whatever is his own.
.. 297 Madison was also critical of excessive regulation. "Where
an excess of power prevails, property of no sort is duly respected.
No man is safe in his opinion, his person, his faculties or his
possessions .,298
That is not just government, nor is property secure under it,
where arbitrary restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies deny
to part of its citizens that free use of their faculties, and free
choice of their occupations, which not only constitute their prop-
erty in the general sense of the word; but are the means of ac-
quiring property strictly so called....
A just security to property is not afforded by that government
under which unequal taxes oppress one species of property and
reward another species; where arbitrary taxes invade the do-
mestic sanctuaries of the rich, and excessive taxes grind the
faces of the poor ....
If there be a government then which prides itself on maintain-
ing the inviolability of property; which provides that none shall
be taken directly even for public use without indemnification to
292 James Madison, Property and Liberty, NAT'L GAZErE, Mar. 29, 1792, reprinted in
THE COMPLETE MADISON: His BASIC WRITINGS 267, 267 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953).
293 Id. Blackstone wrote: "[tihere is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination
and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and despotic
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe." 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *1-2 (emphasis added).
294 See Madison, supra note 292, at 267.
295 Id.
296 Id. at 267-68.
297 Id. at 268.
298 Id. at 267.
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the owner, and yet directly violates the property which individu-
als have in their opinions, their religion, their persons, and their
faculties; nay more, which indirectly violates their property, in
their actual possessions, in the labor that acquires their daily
subsistence, and in the hallowed remnant of time which ought
to relieve their fatigues and soothe their cares, the inference will
have been anticipated, that such a government is not a pattern
for the United States.
If the United States mean to obtain or deserve the full praise
due to wise and just governments, they will equally respect the
rights of property, and the property in rights.29 9
Madison voiced apprehensions about what would occur in the
absence of protections for property rights:
An increase of population will of necessity increase the propor-
tion of those who will labour under all the hardships of life,
[and] secretly sigh for a more equal distribution of its blessings.
These may in time outnumber those who are placed above the
feelings of indigence. According to the equal laws of suffrage,
the power will slide into the hands of the former. No agrarian
attempts have yet been made in this Country, but symptoms of
a leveling spirit . . . have sufficiently appeared in . . . certain
quarters to give notice of the future danger. 0 0
Madison briefly summarized his position on economic freedom
in a speech to the First Congress on April 9, 1789:
I own myself the friend to a very free system of commerce, and
hold it as a truth, that commercial shackles are generally un-
just, oppressive, and impolitic; it is also a truth, that if industry
and labor are left to take their own course, they will generally be
directed to those objects which are the most productive, and this
in a more certain and direct manner than the wisdom of the
most enlightened Legislature could point outY0 1
C. From 1897 to the late 1930s: United States Supreme Court
Protection of Economic Libertiestt
In Allgeyer v. Louisiana,°2 Lochner v. New York,3 °3 Adair v.
United States,3 4 and Coppage v. Kansas,"5 the United States Su-
preme Court applied concepts that frequently guided its substan-
tive due process decisions between 1897 and the mid-1930s.
299 Id. at 268-69.
300 Comments at the Federal Convention, supra note 175, at 422-23.
301 Madison, supra note 292, at 269.
tt The language and ideas in Sections IV.C. and IV.D. are largely drawn from BER-
NARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 110-49 (1980).
302 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
303 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
304 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
305 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
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These decisions applied both the common law and general consti-
tutional law principles to protect individual rights. The last three
cases, which concern labor disputes, are probably the most contro-
versial and should not necessarily be considered representative of
the period, since the Court sustained most labor legislation. 0
The expansion of the due process concept during the late nine-
teenth century occurred in the fashion of the common law to pro-
gressively extend its coverage. In each of the four decisions, the
justices stated they were not intruding on the legislative function,
but were enforcing constitutionally guaranteed rights. 7 They
held that the Constitution's Due Process or Equal Protection
Clauses limited the power of government to diminish the right of
contract.0 The decision that gave constitutional status to liberty
of contract is Allgeyer v. Louisiana, an 1897 unanimous opinion
which aroused few passions. 9
A Louisiana statute made it illegal for any person, firm, or
corporation to obtain marine insurance on property in Louisiana
from an out-of-state company that had not been licensed to carry
on such business in the state. 10 The Allgeyer company was
charged with violating the statute by entering into a contract for
marine insurance with a New York insurance company that had
not complied with Louisiana's law. 11 The company objected that
the law violated both the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 12
Justice Peckham, writing for the United States Supreme
Court, held that the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment
by depriving the defendant of its liberty to contract for insurance
under the Due Process Clause:
The liberty mentioned in that amendment means not only the
right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of
his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to em-
3o6 See Melvin I. Urofsky, Myth and Reality: The Supreme Court and Protective Legis-
lation in the Progressive Era, in Y.B. 1983 Sup. CT. HIST. Soc'y, 53, 61-63, 69-70. See also
WILLIAM G. Ross, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT
THE COURTS, 1890-1937, at 38-39, 41-44 (1994). The author discusses the Supreme
Court's decisions regarding labor in this era. He also discusses the positive trend towards
labor legislation within the context of labor's hostility to the courts. "[T]he Supreme Court
upheld far more state and federal legislation than it struck down .... While the willing-
ness of the Court to uphold so much reform legislation helped to mute that chorus ... [it]
reminded progressives that all reforms had to run the gauntlet of judicial review." Id. at
44.
307 Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161,
177, 179-80 (1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53, 56-57 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisi-
ana, 165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897).
308 Coppage, 236 U.S. at 17-18; Adair, 208 U.S. at 174-75; Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53, 64;
Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 589, 591.
309 Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 589.
310 Id. at 579.
311 Id. at 584-85.
312 Id. at 579-80.
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brace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his
faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and
work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling;
to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to
enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and es-
sential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the pur-
poses above mentioned.313
Peckham cited two sources to support this holding: (1) Justice
Bradley's concurring opinion in the second New Orleans Slaugh-
ter-House case;3 14 and (2) Justice Harlan's majority decision in the
oleomargarine case.3 15 Justice Bradley had asserted:
The right to follow any of the common occupations of life is an
inalienable right; it was formulated as such under the phrase
"pursuit of happiness" in the Declaration of Independence,
which commenced with the fundamental proposition that "all
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, lib-
erty, and the pursuit of happiness." This right is a large ingredi-
ent in the civil liberty of the citizen.... I hold that the liberty of
pursuit-the right to follow any of the ordinary callings of life-
is one of the privileges of a citizen of the United States.3 16
Justice Harlan amplified these observations:
The main proposition advanced by the defendant is that his en-
joyment upon terms of equality with all others in similar cir-
cumstances of the privilege of pursuing an ordinary calling or
trade, and of acquiring, holding, and selling property, is an es-
sential part of his rights of liberty and property, as guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment. The court assents to this gen-
eral proposition as embodying a sound principle of constitu-
tional law.317
Thus, the right to make contracts must be included in the
right to pursue an ordinary calling or trade and to acquire, hold,
and sell property. Every individual and corporate entrepreneur
could now claim the protection of the Federal Constitution against
local and state restrictions that limited economic opportunity.
Thus, economic due process arrived officially for a long stay at the
nation's highest judicial level. Pursuant to the police power, gov-
ernment could seek to impose regulation, but its authority had to
be justified in each situation as not being an arbitrary exercise of
power.
313 Id. at 589.
314 Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 762 (1884) (Bradley, J.,
concurring).
315 Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 684 (1888).
316 Butchers' Union Co., 111 U.S. at 762, 764 (Bradley, J., concurring).
317 Powell, 127 U.S. at 684.
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The technique by which liberty of contract was established
was neither unique nor extraordinary in American jurisprudence.
The declarations of Justices Peckham, Bradley, and Harlan had
been reiterated in substance, in one form or another, at various
times by American and English jurists and legal commentators.
Rights do not have to be named in the Constitution to be accorded
the full authority of that document.
1. Lochner v. New York: Limitations on Work Hours
In 1895, New York had enacted, as part of a measure estab-
lishing sanitary and other working conditions for bakeries and
confectioneries, a provision limiting the number of hours an em-
ployee in such establishments could "be required or permitted" to
work each week to sixty, with a maximum of ten hours a day.1
Lochner, the defendant employer, had been indicted for a violation
of this provision and found guilty by the trial court. 1 9 His convic-
tion was upheld by both the appellate division of the New York
Supreme Court in a three-to-two decision and the New York Court
of Appeals in a four-to-three decision.32 " Lochner appealed his
conviction chiefly on the ground that the law violated his liberty
under the Due Process Clause.3 21' Again, Justice Peckham deliv-
ered the opinion of the United States Supreme Court, but this
time he spoke for only a bare majority.2 2
The statute, the Justice explained, was an absolute prohibi-
tion upon the employer permitting more than ten hours' work,
even if the employee desired to earn the extra money that came
along with those longer hours. As in all cases involving regulatory
legislation adopted pursuant to the police power, the Court could
pursue one of three alternative inquiries. First, it could have se-
lected the approach, set forth in Justice Holmes's dissent, that
would usually allow the legislative judgment to prevail in socio-
economic matters.323 Legislation would be upheld "unless it can be
said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the
statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they
have been understood by the traditions of our people and our
law."324 Second, the Court could have accepted the thesis of an-
other dissenter, Justice Harlan-grandfather of the Warren
Court's Justice Harlan-that the law's benefit to the workers'
health was debatable and that, therefore, allowing for an honest
318 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52 (1905).
319 Id. at 64.
320 Id. at 58.
321 People v. Lochner, 69 N.E. 373, 374 (N.Y. 1904).
322 198 U.S. at 52 (5-4 decision).
323 Id. at 74-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
324 Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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difference of opinion, the Court should not interfere with the legis-
lative determination. 25 The third alternative, the one the major-
ity used, required the state to show beyond question the
legitimacy of the restraint.26
Applying this alternative, the Court had to determine which
power would prevail-the state's police power or the individual's
right to contract. 27 Justice Peckham articulated the test for an-
swering this question, and rejected the notion that a state could
prevail by simply claiming that a regulation related to the public
health.
The act must have a more direct relation, as a means to an end,
and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an
act can be held to be valid which interferes with the general
right of an individual to be free in his person and in his power to
contract in relation to his own labor.22
Justice Peckham was applying what is referred to as a means-
ends test, which can be traced back to Coke's famous decision in
Dr. Bonham's CaseI29 and Blackstone's Commentaries.3 ° Coke
found that a law prohibiting any person-even graduates of the
most prestigious medical schools-from practicing medicine in
London for a month or more without obtaining the approval of the
London College of Physicians did not advance the public health.3
The law was both underinclusive because it allowed anyone to
practice medicine for a month, and overinclusive because it barred
highly trained persons from the practice without permission of the
college. Similarly, Blackstone rejected futile and oppressive laws:
"[Elvery wanton and causeless restraint of the will of the subject
... is a degree of tyranny."332 Justice Peckham's test is currently
widely applied in constitutional jurisprudence.33
325 Id. at 68 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
326 Id. at 56-58.
327 Id. at 57.
328 Id. at 57-58.
329 Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B. 1610).
330 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *75-78. See also supra note 152 and accom-
panying text.
331 77 Eng. Rep. at 651-52.
332 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *126.
333 See supra text accompanying note 153. In addition, the Supreme Court scrutinizes
both the means and ends for which legislation is enacted in a variety of Fourteenth Amend-
ment contexts. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66, 83-84 (2000) (requir-
ing ADEA age classification (the "means") to be rationally related to a legitimate state
interest of preventing age discrimination (the "end")); United States v. Virginia., 518 U.S.
515, 523, 532-33 (1996) (requiring a public institution's gender discrimination (the
'means") achieve an "exceedingly persuasive" objective (the "end")); United States v. Carl-
ton, 512 U.S. 26, 35-36 (1994) (noting that retroactive aspects of economic legislation must
'meet the test of due process: a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means")
(quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191 (1992)). In the takings context,
the Supreme Court may also require a means-end test. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 507 (1977). The Moore court affirmed the application of this test, reiterating
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The means-ends test places the burden of showing the legiti-
macy of the regulation on the state. For example, in the case of
Whitney v. California,334 Justice Brandeis recognized this perspec-
tive in support of the clear-and-present-danger test:
Whenever the fundamental rights of free speech and assembly
are alleged to have been invaded, it must remain open to a de-
fendant to present the issue whether there actually did exist at
the time a clear danger; whether the danger, if any, was immi-
nent; and whether the evil apprehended was one so substantial
as to justify the stringent restriction interposed by the legisla-
ture. The legislative declaration, like the fact that the statute
was passed and was sustained by the highest court of the State,
creates merely a rebuttable presumption that these conditions
have been satisfied.335
Justice Peckham asserted that the right to contract for the
purchase and sale of labor is protected by the Due Process Clauses
unless the legislature proves that the law it has passed will
achieve a legitimate legislative purpose justifying limitation of
these rights. 36 According to Justice Peckham, the state must
demonstrate to the Court's satisfaction the existence of such cir-
cumstances.3 37 "There must be more than the mere fact of the pos-
sible existence of some small amount of unhealthiness to warrant
legislative interference with liberty."33  Laws tending to make
people healthier were not necessarily valid as health laws enacted
under the police power.3 3 9 Although the state argued that the law
was a legitimate exercise of police power, intended to preserve the
health of workers, the proclaimed purpose of the law was not con-
trolling, and more than speculative conclusions and paternalism
had to be shown.3 40 New York had not proven that a material dan-
ger to the employees' or the public's health would exist if working
hours were not curtailed pursuant to the legislation. 4' Unless the
courts restrained the legislatures, all individual actions would in
time be at the mercy of majorities, and none could escape this all-
pervading power. 42
that their "cases have not departed from the requirement that the government's chosen
means must rationally further some legitimate state purpose"). Id. at 498 n.6; Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (requiring rough proportionality); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (requiring an essential nexus).
334 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
335 Id. at 378-79 (Brandeis, J., concurring). Under the clear-and-present-danger test,
a state may not forbid speech except where such advocacy 'is likely to incite or produce"
lawless action. See also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
336 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53-54, 56-57 (1905).
337 Id. at 61.
338 Id. at 59.
339 Id. at 60-61.
340 Id. at 61.
341 Id. at 64.
342 Id. at 60-61.
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Justice Peckham observed that the Court had previously up-
held a Utah law limiting employment in underground mines and
smelters to eight hours a day, except in cases of emergency.3 43 The
New York law, however, could be distinguished from the Utah law
because it covered a situation considered by the majority far less
perilous, and because it allowed no exceptions. 44 As Justice
Harlan noted, the Court would have come to an opposite conclu-
sion had the law limited employment to eighteen hours a day, for
working a longer period would indeed be detrimental to health. 45
Considerable precedent existed at the state level for the ma-
jority decision, and Justice Peckham cited five state cases invali-
dating legislative "interferences" with ordinary trades and
occupations. 46 Three cases struck down the regulation and licens-
ing of the horseshoeing trade on due process or equal protection
grounds.14' These laws required that the person practicing the
trade be examined and certified for competency by an administra-
tive board.345 In one of the cases, New York sought unsuccessfully
to justify such a law as a health regulation. 49 Justice Peckham
also included, as an example of legislative interference, a Ne-
braska holding that invalidated a maximum-hours law that re-
quired substantial pay increases for work in excess of eight hours
a day, and a Pennsylvania decision that outlawed a statute that
fixed the rate of wages for puddlers. 350 "In these cases," Peckham
stated, "the courts upheld the right of free contract," including the
purchase and sale of labor upon mutually acceptable terms.35 1
That the Court in the period under discussion was not averse
to welfare measures is demonstrated by the fact that it sustained
many challenged labor laws. Its upholding of the Utah law limit-
ing hours of work has already been noted. For example, in 1908,
the Court accepted a statute imposing a ten-hour workday on wo-
men employed in a factory or laundry. 52 Similarly, in 1917, the
Court found valid a regulation that limited the working day of any
person employed in any mill, factory, or manufacturing establish-
ment to ten hours, but provided some exceptions, including a
343 Id. at 54 (citing Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898)).
344 Id. at 55, 59.
345 Id. at 71 (Harlan, White, & Day, JJ., dissenting).
346 Id. at 63. Justice Peckham cited the following five cases: People v. Beattie, 89
N.Y.S. 193 (N.Y. App. Div. 1904); In re Aubry, 78 P. 900 (Wash. 1904); Bessette v. People, 62
N.E. 215 (Ill. 1901); Godcharles & Co. v. Wigeman, 6 A. 354 (Pa. 1886); Low v. Rees Print-
ing Co., 59 N.W. 362 (Neb. 1894).
347 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 63 (citing People v. Beattie, 89 N.Y.S. 193, 194, 198-99 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1904); In re Aubry, 78 P. 900, 900-01, 903 (Wash. 1904); Bessette v. People, 62
N.E. 215, 217, 220 (Ill. 1901)).
348 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 63.
349 Id.
350 Id. See also Low, 59 N.W. at 363; Godcharles, 6 A. at 355-56.
351 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 63-64.
352 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 416-17, 423 (1908).
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three-hour overtime period with time-and-a-half pay. 53 In the
Lochner decision, the Court implied that the remaining parts of
the New York law that imposed strict sanitation and working con-
ditions were valid regulations. 54 Professor David Bernstein has
listed a large number of United States Supreme Court cases de-
cided in the Lochner period that upheld federal and state welfare
laws.
355
According to the Lochner majority, a legislature could circum-
scribe liberty of contract to purchase or sell labor if the measure
clearly secured workers' health. 6 In his dissent in Lochner, Jus-
tice Harlan cited considerable professional support for the legisla-
tive determination that the hours limitation accomplished this
result.35 7 Even if correct in this respect, however, such evidence
does not completely resolve the issue. A means-ends analysis re-
quires consideration of the tightness of the fit between the means
and the ends. 8 Justice Harlan's dissent fails to consider that the
mandated reduction in working hours might create appreciable
health problems for many workers (the cost of doctors, drugs, and
hospitals, and for food, clothing, and shelter, especially for fami-
lies). New York's law was overinclusive because it applied not
only to workers whose health benefited from a shorter workday,
but it also applied to workers who suffer health problems from the
loss of earnings that accompanies a cut in working hours. 9 Jus-
tice Peckham noted that limitations upon hours "might seriously
cripple the ability of the laborer to support himself and his fam-
ily."36 ° Indeed, the hours limitation exacerbated workers'
poverty. 361
The Lochner majority asserted the Supreme Court's power
and responsibility to scrutinize legislative limitations of impor-
tant rights. In addition to protecting an employer's right to con-
tract, the Lochner court also secured the contract rights of many
workers who would be adversely affected by the limitation of their
working hours. The United States Supreme Court has at various
353 Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 433-34, 438-39 (1917).
354 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64.
355 David E. Bernstein, Lochner's Legacy's Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct.
2003) (on file with Chapman Law Review).
356 198 U.S. at 53, 61.
357 Id. at 70-71 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
358 For example, few people would urge passage of a law to prohibit driving of automo-
biles even though such a law would likely save thousands of lives lost annually from auto-
mobile accidents.
359 See PAUL H. DOUGLAS, REAL WAGES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1890-1926, at 6-7
(1930) [hereinafter REAL WAGES] (discussing generally the effect total work hours may
have on actual wages).
36o Lochner, 198 U.S. at 59.
361 As far back as Tooley's Case, Coke asserted that "a man is not to be restrained that
he shall not labor for his living." 80 Eng. Rep. 1055, 1059 (K.B. 1613) (per author's own
translation). See discussion supra Part III.A.2.a.
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times invalidated such legislative overinclusiveness. Thus, Jus-
tice Douglas writing for the majority in the famous case Griswold
v. Connecticut,362 which struck down a Connecticut law banning
use of contraceptives because it applied to married persons, stated
that "[s] uch a law cannot stand in light of the familiar principle, so
often applied by this Court, that a 'governmental purpose to con-
trol or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regula-
tion may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.'"363
Bakery workers dissatisfied with the loss in income could, of
course, seek employment in another industry or part-time work at
another bakery. Most employees in a Lochner-type bakery would
find it difficult to exercise either of these options because they
were recent immigrants, not fluent in English and probably not
knowledgeable about the job market.
Shortening long working hours generally tends to increase la-
bor productivity and thereby operates to benefit employers. The
Lochner statute would have reduced average working hours by
roughly fifteen percent-from about seventy-two hours a week to
about sixty.3 64 Labor experience suggests that a like increase in
the productivity of workers would be extraordinary. 365 The extent
to which this will occur in any specific situation is, however,
speculative.
Professor William Panschar has described the nation's turn-
of-the-century baking industry as a "study in contrasts."36 The
largest segment of the industry was the small-scale bakeries,
which differed little from their colonial counterparts. 67 Lochner
involved this kind of enterprise. The other portion consisted of
industrial bakers using the more mechanized baking techniques
and distribution methods familiar to contemporary society.3 The
trend was clearly toward greater industrialization.36 9 New York's
law, aimed at regulating structural, sanitary, mechanical, and
working conditions, would have only hastened the process by ad-
ding to the small owners' costs. 370
362 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
363 Id. at 485 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964)).
364 See supra text accompanying note 318.
365 See 1 WILLIAM G. PANscHAR, BAKING IN AMERICA 68-70 (1956). In the early 1900s
most bakeries were small. Small bakeries were known for their pride in craftsmanship and
were highly resistant to change. 1 id. They also tended to have less than four workers and
were characterized by labor intensive, non-mechanized processes. 1 id. Thus, it is doubtful
that decreasing their hours would have had such a substantial increase in productivity.
366 1 id. 45.
367 1 id.
368 1 id.
369 1 id. at 46-47.
370 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61-62 (1905). See Note, Resurrecting Economic
Rights: The Doctrine of Economic Due Process Reconsidered, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1363,
1371-72, nn.70-73 (1990) (discussing how government regulations tend to increase prices).
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Kyrk and Davis supply national statistics showing the indus-
try's changing structure.3 7' "In 1899 only 2 per cent of the baking
establishments were owned by corporations, as compared with 7
per cent in 1919 .... During this period the corporate portion
of the industry's output rose from 28.7 to 51.8 percent. 73 Between
1909 and 1919, the average number of wage-earners in corporate-
controlled bakeries was about forty-four, as contrasted with an av-
erage work force of fewer than three people in the bakeries under
other forms of ownership.
3 74
In New York, as elsewhere, the baking industry was split be-
tween sizeable bakeries whose plants had been specifically built
or fully converted for such purposes, and small bakeries, operating
out of limited, often subterranean quarters not originally intended
for such use. The Bureau of the Census reports that in 1905,
there were 3,164 bakeries in New York State, of which 2,870 were
owned by individuals, 228 by firms, and 64 by corporations. 75 In
that year, the individuals employed 10,804 workers, the firms
1,672, and the corporations 5,232, averaging 3.76, 7.33, and 81.75
workers per enterprise, respectively. 6  Percentages of total
bakery output maintained by each group was '62.5, 9.7, and
27.8. The New York trend was also toward bigger operations: in
1900, individuals had owned 2,767, firms 188, and corporations 44
bakery establishments. 73 These figures indicate that during the
periods studied, the baking industry was very competitive; it was
virtually impossible for employers to control wages.
A survey by the State Labor Bureau in 1896 of eight New
York cities disclosed that the bakers' average working time per
week was seventy-two and two-thirds hours. 79 Many workers in
the small bakeries of New York City-and probably elsewhere in
the state-were recent immigrants unable to speak English, who
were attracted to owners speaking their language.3 0 The small
371 HAZEL KYRK & JOSEPH S. DAVIS, THE AMERICAN BAKING INDUSTRY 1849-1923 AS
SHOWN IN THE CENSUS REPORTS 26 (1925).
372 Id. at 36.
373 Id.
374 Id. at 37, 97.
375 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, BULLETIN No. 59,
CENSUS OF MANUFACTURERS: 1905, NEW YORK 30 (1906).
376 Id. at 33. Workers per enterprise equals the number of worker in each category of
enterprise divided by the total number of enterprises for that category.
377 Id.
378 Id. at 726, 729.
379 The Statistics of the Journeyman Bakers of the State of New York, BAKERS J., June
3, 1896, at 1.
38o Even the defendants admitted that the statute was created to control the new im-
migrant population attracted to the bakeries. "Another consideration for this class of legis-
lation in the State of New York is the fact that there have come to that State great numbers
of foreigners with habits which must be changed so that in due course of time there may be
that assimilation which has made so successful our previous immigrations." Brief for De-
fendant at 14, Lochner v. United States, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (No. 292).
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owners frequently provided their laborers with sleeping quarters,
enabling them to spend long hours on the job.3 81 The time limita-
tion on working hours would have caused the small owners to hire
additional help. 2  It might be difficult to hire someone at the ex-
isting rate of pay because the reduction in hours might be less
than a day's work. 83 As for current employees, it is unlikely that
weekly wages-which were already very low-could be cut propor-
tionately to approximate the decrease in working hours, or that
worker productivity would increase sufficiently to compensate for
this difference. 4 Consequently the restrictions on working hours
meant higher labor costs for the small bakers, who, due to compe-
tition from the corporate bakers, were limited in the amount they
could pass on in the form of higher prices. A number of the small
bakers would have to terminate their businesses.8
The effect on the larger bakeries would be far less adverse.
They were much closer to the hour standard and, unlike the small
bakeries, might sustain only a modest increase in costs if they had
to hire more workers. 6 Extra production costs, however, would
be offset by the lessened competition from the small bakeries,
which could lead to higher prices. 7
Contemporary articles in the New York Times reported that
sanitary, health, and working conditions in the small bakeries
were far below those in the large ones. Referring to the statute in
question, Frederick Endres, secretary of a journeyman bakers'
and confectioners' union, explained: "Of course the bill was not
aimed at the big bakeries, for they invariably comply with sani-
tary regulations, but it was directed against the small bakeries,
where every sanitary consideration is disregarded."34 The same
sentiment was echoed by Edward Thimme, editor of the Bakers'
Journal, who argued, "The cause of this trouble is that the small
bakeries are owned by ignorant persons. The large bakeries are
381 For example, the New York Times noted that bakers "sometimes leave the
bakeshops only once a week." War on Filthy Bakeries, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1896, at 6. The
article also graphically described the inadequacies of sleeping accommodations. Id.
382 Given the low probability of a significant shift in productivity from decreased work
hours, more workers would be needed to fill in the lost hours of work. See infra text accom-
panying note 421.
383 The reduction of approximately twelve hours per worker for a six-day week would
have resulted in two hours of work daily. The total time required to fill in lost time would
be dependent on the total number of workers the bakery contained. Ultimately, the market
for part-time workers would have affected the wage this worker received.
384 See KYRK & DAVIs, supra note 371, at 48 (discussing the lower wage scale in the
baking industry as compared to manufacturing in general); PANscHAR, supra note 365, at
84 (noting the prevalence of small bakeries in the baking industry and their resistance to
change).
385 See PANscHAR, supra note 365, at 79-81 (discussing the nature of competition
caused by the changing industrial landscape).
386 Id. at 64-66 (discussing the efficiency of the larger bakeries).
387 Id. at 81 (discussing competition generally).
388 Bakery Inspection Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1896, at 9.
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conducted in an exemplary manner. " "' Conrad Moll, president of
a small bakery owners' association, complained "[iut is impossible
for small bakeries to comply with all the laws. The laws are all in
favor of the large bakeries, and the aim seems to be to drive the
small bakeries out of business."390 It is likely that the more mod-
ern bakeries did not oppose or even supported working restric-
tions that would adversely affect their less modern competitors.
Working hours were much longer in the small bakeries than
in the large ones, and the maximum-hours provision affected em-
ployers and employees of the former much more. In a report dated
January 27, 1896, almost seven months after the effective date of
the law, state factory inspectors reported that workers in some
small bakeries-"found in noisesome cellars and unfit surround-
ings"-remained on the business premises (if not actually on the
job) from twelve to as many as twenty-two hours a working day. 9'
The workday in the larger firms, "those conducted on a modern
plan, with improved appliances and proper workrooms," met or
was close to the statutory maximum of ten hours. 92
Presumably, the bulk of the workers in the small bakeries
were engaged in the most remunerative employment they could
find. 93 This was particularly true for the new immigrants, whose
knowledge of English and their new country was limited. The
question arises of how the health and welfare of the people who
worked long, arduous hours for relatively small wages would be
helped by substantially lowering their working time and wages,
leaving them with more leisure but much less to spend on the ne-
cessities of life. Perhaps worst of all, those employed by bakeries
driven out of business by the added costs would lose their jobs.
Nor could a law under these circumstances be very effective as
violations-prior to the law being declared unconstitutional-
were probably extensive. The law could not alleviate the needs of
389 War on Filthy Bakeries, supra note 381, at 6.
390 Bakery Inspection Law, supra note 388, at 9.
391 FACTORY INSPECTORS, STATE OF NEW YORK, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT 42 (1896).
392 Id.
The length of time which is considered a day's labor in bakeries varies greatly-
those conducted on a modern plan, with improved appliances and proper work-
rooms, rarely work their men more than ten hours a day; while in those which
were found in noisesome cellars and unfit surroundings the men were compelled to
work twelve to twenty-two hours.
Id.
393 According to the New York Times, the bakers endured the conditions because others
were willing to take their place at the same wage. "When workmen in these small shops
complain or tell of existing conditions, they are discharged, and plenty of men can be found
to take their places." War on the Filthy Bakeries, supra note 381, at 6. Thus, it follows that
these workers took these positions not because of work conditions, but because it was likely
the best money they could make. See REAL WAGES, supra note 359, at 96 (listing bakeries'
hourly wage as the lowest of "union" manufacturing industries); KYRK & DAvIS, supra note
371, at 26 (stating that bakery wages were lower than those in manufacturing).
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an ever-increasing flood of immigrants eager to satisfy their wants
and ambitions.
The reaction to Lochner might have been less harsh had the
critics recognized that the law probably would have reduced con-
siderably the wages of many low-paid workers, and caused others
to lose their jobs. Commentators may still insist that, from the
workers' perspective, health and safety with less pay is preferable
to long hours in an unpleasant environment. 94 This is far more
true for workers in underground mines and smelting than, say,
clerks in commercial offices. Bakery workers are somewhere in
between, and for the Lochner majority, the evidence in this re-
gard, given prevailing labor conditions, was not sufficient to allow
for legislative interference. 95
Nor was the legislative mandate essential to achieve shorter
working hours.06 The average length of the workday for bakery
employees nationally declined from about ten hours in 1909, to
nine hours in 1914, to eight hours in 1919, lengthening slightly in
192 1.3 7 A survey of working hours for union workers in various
industries shows that on the average, union bakers worked 64.5
hours per week in 1890; 59.3 in 1905; 52.5 in 1915; and 47.8 in
1926.398
2. Adair v. United States and Coppage v. Kansas: The
Union Cases
Although demanding more than sixty hours of labor a week
seems exploitative to modern sensibilities, even more anguish sur-
rounds the thought of an employer firing an employee for engag-
ing in union activity. Today, a great many people would favor a
law forbidding employers from requiring a person, as a condition
of employment, to agree not to become or remain a member of a
labor union. Proponents of such a law probably would include
most of the Supreme Court Justices appointed by President
Franklin Roosevelt and his successors. 9 It is doubtful that these
jurists could ever be persuaded that such legislation is unconstitu-
394 Scott D. Miller, Revitalizing the FLSA, 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 10-12
(2001). See also Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause and
Revising the Slaughter-House Cases Without Exhuming Lochner: Individual Rights and
the Fourteenth Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996) (discussing workers' preference for
more government control of industry).
395 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 58 (1905).
396 After Lochner-which made legislation of maximum hours unconstitutional-
weekly hours continued to decline. KYRK & DAvIs, supra note 371, at 60-61, 108.
397 Id. at 61.
398 REAL WAGES, supra note 359, at 112.
399 See Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., Historical Perspectives: An Unabashed Liberal Looks at a
Half-Century of the Supreme Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 213, 218, 220 (1990) (discussing the
effects of President Franklin Roosevelt's Supreme Court appointments and the positions
taken by his appointed justices).
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tional. In this regard, adverse reaction to the Adair and Coppage
decisions is understandable. This position fails, however, to per-
ceive the wisdom of an earlier day concerning the sanctity of con-
tractual arrangements.
Both of these cases involved anti-union promises that the un-
ions called "yellow dog" contracts. 40 0 The constitutionality of a fed-
eral statute outlawing such contracts in the railroad industry was
at issue in the 1907 case of Adair v. United States.40 1 There, a
railroad agent had been convicted of violating the statute by firing
an employee for belonging to a union.402 The United States Su-
preme Court reversed.4 3 A six-to-two majority found that the law
in question invaded both the personal liberty and right of property
protected by the Fifth Amendment.4 4 Seven years later, a major-
ity of six justices took a similar position in Coppage v. Kansas,4 °5
setting aside, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, the convic-
tion under a Kansas statute of a railroad agent for discharging an
employee who would neither sign an agreement to withdraw from
a union nor resign from it. 40 6
These cases presented essentially the same issue as Lochner:
Is there sufficient reason for the legislation to qualify as an excep-
tion to the prevailing doctrine of liberty of contract? The laws in
these cases were advanced as promoting the growth of unionism,
which, it was argued, was essential for the public welfare. The
court viewed the controversy in much narrower terms, as Justice
Harlan explained in Adair:
The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he
deems proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of the pur-
chaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will
accept such labor from the person offering to sell it. So the right
of the employ6 to quit the service of the employer, for whatever
reason, is the same as the right of the employer, for whatever
reason, to dispense with the services of such employ6.4 °7
In Coppage, Justice Pitney asserted that the anti-union re-
quirement is no more onerous than the condition that an employee
work full time exclusively for a single employer. 4 ' He wrote that
whenever the right of private property exists, "there must and will
be inequalities of fortune; and thus it naturally happens that par-
400 Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161,
168-69 (1908).
401 Adair, 208 U.S. at 166-69.
402 Id. at 169-71.
403 Id. at 180.
404 Id. at 180, 190 (McKenna & Holmes, JJ., dissenting).
405 236 U.S. at 13-14, 26-27 (Holmes, Day, & Hughes, JJ., dissenting).
406 Id. at 6-7, 26.
407 208 U.S. at 174-75.
408 236 U.S. at 13.
20031
Chapman Law Review
ties negotiating about a contract are not equally unhampered by
circumstances. '40 9 Accordingly, to deprive a negotiating party of
the advantage of a superior situation, brought about by such cir-
cumstances, is to deprive that party of a property right.410 The
quest for economic equality is constitutionally limited.41' Justice
Pitney continued:
This applies to all contracts, and not merely to that between em-
ployer and employd. Indeed a little reflection will show that
wherever the right of private property and the right of free con-
tract co-exist, each party when contracting is inevitably more or
less influenced by the question whether he has much property,
or little, or none; for the contract is made to the very end that
each may gain something that he needs or desires more ur-
gently than that which he proposes to give in exchange. And,
since it is self-evident that, unless all things are held in com-
mon, some persons must have more property than others, it is
from the nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of con-
tract and the right of private property without at the same time
recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are
the necessary result of the exercise of those rights.412
Such passages do not endear the Court to reformers deter-
mined to use the judiciary and legislatures to reduce social and
economic inequalities. These reformers see Adair and Coppage as
maintaining, if not augmenting, the superior powers of employers.
Serious questions exist, however, about the effectiveness and de-
sirability of laws intended to offset or ameliorate inequalities.
Both decisions came at a time when unions were still highly con-
troversial institutions in this country.4 3
Moreover, unions raised philosophical problems for judges. In
his analysis of the antislavery movement's impact upon judicial
reasoning, William Nelson explains that judges who had received
their education or commenced their professional careers during
the Civil War era viewed labor and unions much differently than
does our modern society. 414 Freedom of contract for both employer
and employee was strongly espoused by the antislavery move-
ment.41 It was accepted that the right of the individual to bestow
his labor as he pleased was among the rights for which the Civil
409 Id. at 17.
410 Id.
411 Id.
412 Id.
413 CHESTER WHITNEY WRIGHT, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 618-19 (2d
ed. 1949). Union membership grew to a peak of 17.5 percent in 1920 following the war, but
declined to 9.3 percent in 1930. Id.
414 William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial
Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARv. L. REV. 513, 557 (1974).
415 Id. at 532, 537-38, 556-57.
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War had been fought.41 Many judges of the period feared that
unions would obliterate these and other legal and natural
rights.417 Given the values that emerged triumphantly from the
war, some judges found it simply "preposterous" that unions re-
place slaveholders and "attempt to issue orders that free men are
bound to obey .... "418
Labor union practices greatly disturbed adherents of the
widely followed individualist philosophy.419 Those joining unions
had to subordinate themselves to the will of the organization.
Workers who went on strike insisted that they had not given up
their jobs and claimed a right to those positions over other work-
ers eager to work. ° Enforcing this "right" required picket lines,
threats, and at times violence directed not only at employers but
also at other workers. Moreover, union policies encouraged ineffi-
ciency.421 In 1869, John Stuart Mill wrote: "Some of the Unionist
regulations go even further than to prohibit improvements; they
are contrived for the express purpose of making work inefficient;
they positively prohibit the workman from working hard and well,
in order that it may be necessary to employ a greater number."422
Accordingly, Justice Pitney's contention in Coppage that gov-
ernment has no legitimate interest in encouraging unions was far
less controversial than contemporary generations might suppose.
The Court believed that the labor market itself would operate to
support the welfare of both workers and employers.423 The fact
that today a large majority of workers do not belong to unions may
suggest that they do not contest this conclusion.
Despite Adair and Coppage, unions did organize thousands of
workers, and their existence aided numerous others. 4  Many
workers received compensation for pledging not to join unions, the
amounts depending on the fluctuations of the labor market.425
These promises would have been costlier to obtain when unem-
ployment was relatively low, as it frequently was during the first
416 Id. at 557.
417 Id.
418 Id. at 557 (citing In re Higgins, 27 F. 443, 445 (C.C.N.D. Tex. 1886)).
419 See David Montgomery, Workers' Control of Machine Production in the Nineteenth
Century, in THE LABOR HISTORY READER 107, 115-18 (Daniel J. Leab ed., 1985) (discussing
how union work rules were not individualistic and did not promote the autonomy of the
craftsman).
420 HENRY HAZLIr, THE CONQUEST OF POVERTY 133 (1973).
421 Id. at 139.
422 Id. (quoting John Stuart Mill).
423 Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1915).
424 WRIGHT, supra note 413, at 613-19 (discussing the history of the labor movement in
the United States).
425 CHARLES 0. GREGORY & HAROLD A. KATZ, LABOR LAw: CASES, MATERIALS AND COM-
MENTS 122 (1948).
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quarter of the century.426 That Adair-Coppage kept workers from
flocking to unions is most doubtful. As of 1976, about forty years
after legislation turned favorable to their growth, labor organiza-
tion membership constituted less than twenty-one percent of the
entire labor force.427 Total union membership peaked in the mid-
dle 1950s, reaching about twenty-five percent.425
In the era of Lochner, Adair, and Coppage, real wages were
rising, working hours decreasing, and the country's wealth grow-
ing.429 "By 1914, the national income exceeded that of the United
Kingdom, Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, and Italy com-
bined[,] and per capita income was well above that of any other
great nation."43 ° Between the end of the Civil War and beginning
of World War I, real gross national product grew at a historically
high rate.43' It is estimated that the purchasing power of wages
(exclusive of agriculture), measured by the relationship of wages
either to wholesale or to retail prices, trebled between 1840 and
1914-15.432 Working hours declined substantially; and the aver-
age daily scheduled work hours in manufacturing and mechanical
establishments decreased from 11.5 in 1850, to 9.8 in 1900, and
then to 8.5 in 1920433-a reduction of about twenty-five percent for
the entire period. The average work hours per week in all manu-
facturing industries declined from 60 in 1890 to 50.3 in 1926. 434
Because relatively few welfare laws or unions existed in those
decades, the betterment of life must be attributed to the success of
the economic system. It was not difficult to conclude that this suc-
cess could be undermined by limiting entrepreneurial freedom-
that which harms businesses also injures the livelihoods of the
426 U. S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, THE STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM
COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 121-22, 124, 135 (1976) [hereinafter STATISTICAL His-
TORY]. National unemployment in the first quarter of the century remained below 8%, ex-
cept for highs of 11.7% in 1921 and 8.5% in 1915). Id. at 135, tbl.D 85-86.
427 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATIS-
TICS, BULLETIN No. 2070, at 412 tbl.165 (1980). See also News Release for Labor Day
Weekend, Labor Union and Employee Association Membership-1976, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, United States Dep't of Labor (1977) (on file with author).
428 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATIS-
TICS, BULLETIN No. 2070, at 412 tbl.165 (1980).
429 See infra notes 430-34 and accompanying text.
430 Wright, supra note 413, at 429, 889.
431 STATISTICAL HISTORY, supra 426, at 224 tbl.F 1-5.
432 GEORGE F. WARREN & FRANK A. PEARSON, GOLD AND PRICES 316-17 (1935) (wages
and wholesale prices); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HISTORY OF
WAGES IN THE UNITED STATES FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO 1928, at 521 (wages); STATISTICAL
HISTORY, supra note 426, at 211 tbl.E 135-66 (wages and consumer prices). According to
these sources, wholesale and consumer prices were virtually the same in 1914-15 as in
1840, while wage rates per hour for all industries other than agriculture rose threefold for
this period. On this basis, the purchasing power of nonagricultural wages increased be-
tween 1840 and 1915 at an average annual compound rate slightly in excess of 1.5%.
433 CARROLL R. DAUGHERTY, LABOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 192 (5th ed.
1941).
434 REAL WAGES, supra note 359, at 116.
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people they employ and the quantity of goods they produce. The
Supreme Court's concept of liberty enabled the economy to con-
tinue providing a great measure of material benefits. The Su-
preme Court also considered the scope of economic freedom and
limitations on government regulation in areas such as entry into
business, regulation of prices, and wage rates.
a. Entry into Business
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann43 s concerned a 1925 Oklahoma
statute that declared that the manufacture of ice for sale and dis-
tribution is a "public business" and conferred upon the corporation
commission powers of regulation customarily exercised in connec-
tion with public utilities. The act made it a misdemeanor to en-
gage in this business without obtaining a certificate of public
convenience and necessity from the commission.43 The agency
was given wide discretion in issuing the certificate; the law al-
lowed a denial whenever the existing facilities "are sufficient to
meet the public needs."4 3' The ice industry strongly backed pas-
sage of the legislation.43 New State had for some time been en-
gaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of ice in
Oklahoma City, and had invested $500,000 in the business.439
Liebmann purchased land in the city and commenced construction
of an ice plant that would compete with New State.44 ° Liebmann
never applied for a certificate from the commission, and New
State sued to enjoin his operation."'
In response to Liebmann's constitutional challenge, two philo-
sophical opponents squared off-Sutherland for the majority of
six, and Brandeis for the minority of two" 2 (one Justice not partic-
ipating). The majority said that Oklahoma had not presented jus-
tification to warrant infringing Liebmann's liberty to enter the
market.443 The facts did not disclose a natural monopoly or
threats to public health or safety."4 Brandeis's dissenting opin-
ion, which outweighed (32-10 pages) and outpointed (57-0 foot-
notes) his opponent's, also dealt much more with economic theory
than did Sutherland's.445 Yet Brandeis's opinion reflected a per-
spective that would find limited favor among economists today.
435 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
436 Id. at 271.
437 Id. at 272.
438 Id. at 278-80 (discussing how the legislation prevented small ice distributors from
competing with the larger distributors).
439 Id. at 281 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
44o Id.
441 Id.
442 Id. at 271, 280.
443 Id. at 278-79.
444Id.
445 Id. at 280-311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2003]
Chapman Law Review
He wrote that the statute was not unreasonable or arbitrary and
that it should therefore prevail. According to Brandeis, Oklahoma
should at least be allowed to experiment with this effort to provide
a solution to a pressing problem.446
The main points and crucial language from Justice Suther-
land's analysis are as follows: First, although ice is a necessity,
ice-making is a private business, no different from other necessary
but non-regulated businesses.
It is a business as essentially private in its nature as the busi-
ness of the grocer, the dairyman, the butcher, the baker, the
shoemaker, or the tailor, each of whom performs a service
which, to a greater or less[er] extent, the community is depen-
dent upon and is interested in having maintained.... It may be
quite true that in Oklahoma ice is, not only an article of prime
necessity, but indispensable; but certainly not more so than food
or clothing or the shelter of a home.447
Second, entry into the ice business was costly, but this fact applies
to numerous other businesses in which competition exists. Moreo-
ver, appliances to make ice could be purchased "for a compara-
tively moderate outlay," providing a competitive restraint on
price.4" Third, the practical tendency of the restrictions was to
shut out new enterprises and thus to create and foster a monopoly
in the existing establishments. 449
The control here asserted does not protect against monopoly,
but tends to foster it. The aim is not to encourage competition,
but to prevent it; not to regulate the business, but to preclude
persons from engaging in it. There is no difference in principle
between this case and the attempt of the dairyman under state
authority to prevent another from keeping cows and selling milk
on the ground that there are enough dairymen in the business;
or to prevent a shoemaker from making or selling shoes because
shoemakers already in that occupation can make and sell all the
shoes that are needed. We are not able to see anything peculiar
in the business here in question which distinguishes it from or-
dinary manufacture and production.... There is nothing in the
product that we can perceive on which to rest a distinction, in
respect of this attempted control, from other products in com-
mon use which enter into free competition, subject, of course, to
reasonable regulations prescribed for the protection of the pub-
lic and applied with appropriate impartiality.450
Moreover, Justice Sutherland asserted that Justice Bran-
deis's contention that Oklahoma should be allowed to engage in
446 Id. at 311.
447 Id. at 277.
448 Id. at 277-78.
449 Id. at 278-79.
450 Id. at 279.
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this experiment to ascertain the desirability and feasibility of the
law would deny constitutional protection to would-be entrepre-
neurs. Justice Sutherland declared:
[Tihere are certain essentials of liberty with which the state is
not entitled to dispense in the interest of experiments .... The
opportunity to apply one's labor and skill in an ordinary occupa-
tion with proper regard for all reasonable regulations is no less
entitled to protection [than freedom of the press].451
Justice Brandeis's lengthy dissent constitutes an engaging ex-
planation of the regulatory process. The Justice sought to explain
how regulation could prevent the needless "waste" and "destruc-
tiveness" of competition, provide for an equitable return to produc-
ers, and allow for a wider and less costly distribution of goods to
the consumer.452 He cited the ice industry's aversion to competi-
tion and its approval of the law to support his argument.453 Jus-
tice Brandeis was not concerned that competition would be
eliminated.
It is no objection to the validity of the statute here assailed that
it fosters monopoly. That, indeed, is its design. The certificate of
public convenience and invention is a device-a recent social-
economic invention-through which the monopoly is kept under
effective control by vesting in a commission the power to termi-
nate it whenever that course is required in the public interest.
To grant any monopoly to any person as a favor is forbidden,
even if terminable. But where, as here, there is reasonable
ground for the legislative conclusion that, in order to secure a
necessary service at reasonable rates, it may be necessary to
curtail the right to enter the calling, it is, in my opinion, consis-
tent with the due process clause to do so, whatever the nature of
the business. The existence of such power in the Legislature
seems indispensable in our ever-changing society.4"4
Despite his extensive analysis, Justice Brandeis did not probe
the legislative conclusion that regulation would provide greater
service at more reasonable rates than does the market. He will-
ingly accepted the legislature's contentions in this regard. Yet,
possibly even under Justice Brandeis's own standards for review,
the law would have to fail if such an outcome were remote or un-
likely. At the time he wrote, the country had little experience
with economic regulation, and theory thus had to substitute for
practice.
451 Id. at 280.
452 Id. at 282, 292.
453 Id. at 291-93.
454 Id. at 304.
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b. Regulation of Prices
In 1931, milk prices in New York State declined drastically,
and by 1932 the prices farmers received for milk were below the
cost of production. 455 A joint committee of the state senate and
assembly was created to investigate this situation and to recom-
mend solutions.456 The committee was organized in May 1932,
and its activities lasted almost a year.45 v Responding to the com-
mittee's request to impose regulation, the state legislature, in
April 1933, adopted a statute, to expire in March 1934, effectively
making the milk industry a public utility and establishing a three-
member Milk Control Board with vast powers to regulate the in-
dustry, including setting prices at the retail level.45 In fixing
prices, the Board had to consider the amount necessary to yield a
"reasonable return" to the milk producers and dealers.4 59 The pri-
mary object of the legislation was to improve the farmers' eco-
nomic position.46 °
The Board made it a crime to sell milk below nine cents a
quart in a retail store. 4 1 Nebbia, who owned a small store in
Rochester, sold two bottles of milk and a loaf of bread for eighteen
cents and was subsequently convicted of committing a misde-
meanor for violating the milk control law.462 Prices at which pro-
ducers could sell were not then prescribed, nor was production in
any way limited. In Nebbia v. New York,463 the United States Su-
preme Court, in a five-to-four decision, upheld the conviction
against a challenge that it violated the seller's rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection
clauses.
The Nebbia opinion was historically significant in that it sig-
naled the approaching end of economic substantive due process.464
Rejecting the standard that had previously applied, the majority
held that the due process guarantee demands only that the law be
not unreasonable or arbitrary and that it have a substantial rela-
tion to the objective sought to be achieved. 4" The Justices repudi-
ated the exception that the Court had previously reserved, in
determining the validity of economic regulations, for businesses
455 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 515 (1934).
456 Id. at 516.
457 Id.
458 See Milk Control Act, ch. 158, §§ 300-19, 1934 N.Y. Laws 558 (repealed 1934).
459 Id. § 312(a).
460 Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 550-51.
461 Id. at 515.
462 Id.
463 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934).
464 See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (upholding economic due pro-
cess but later overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)).
465 Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 525.
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affected with a public interest.46 Under substantive due process,
price restraint had been sanctioned only in such unique circum-
stances.467 The majority, however, set forth a new rule embodying
much more limited scrutiny of legislative action. Through Justice
Roberts, the majority ruled that under existing circumstances, it
was not unreasonable for New York to enact legislation that de-
prived Nebbia of the liberty to sell milk at a price of his own choos-
ing.46 Justice Roberts opined that price controls were subject to
the same standard of review as any other form of economic
regulation.469
The four dissenters totally rejected this standard of review.
Writing for the dissenting justices, Justice McReynolds contended
that the only question presented by the case was whether justifi-
cation existed for depriving Nebbia of his rights under the Four-
teenth Amendment.470 Justice McReynolds sought to determine
whether the legislation could be upheld because it was a tempo-
rary response to an emergency, or because the milk business bears
such a special relationship to the public that the price of milk may
be prescribed irrespective of emergency conditions-because it is a
business affected with a public interest.471
The minority opinion denied that either condition existed or
that the statute could meet a means-ends test of validity. Justice
McReynolds wrote that the state had not met the burden of estab-
lishing the presence of an emergency whose magnitude justified
the law.472 The Justice found that requiring the grocer to disprove
its existence was neither fair nor appropriate: "If necessary for ap-
pellant to show absence of the asserted conditions, the little grocer
was helpless from the beginning-the practical difficulties were
too great for the average man."473 Moreover, the legislative find-
ings and report should not be deemed conclusive:
May one be convicted of crime upon such findings? Are federal
rights subject to extinction by reports of committees? Hereto-
fore, they have not been.... The exigency is of the kind which
inevitably arises when one set of men continue to produce more
than all others can buy. The distressing result to the producer
followed his ill-advised but voluntary efforts. Similar situations
occur in almost every business. If here we have an emergency
sufficient to empower the Legislature to fix sales prices, then
whenever there is too much or too little of an essential thing-
466 Id. at 531.
467 Id. at 534-35.
468 Id. at 539.
469 Id.
470 Id. at 543 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). Justice McReynolds wrote for Justices Van
Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler. Id. at 559.
471 Id. at 544.
472 Id. at 548.
473 Id.
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whether of milk or grain or pork or coal or shoes or clothes-
constitutional provisions may be declared inoperative .. .
Justice McReynolds found that the industry was a private
calling not affected with a public interest.475 He questioned the
wisdom of the regulation and denied that the means proposed
would achieve the legislative purpose.476 The Justice could not
fathom how the imposition of higher prices at the retail level-an
imposition that would reduce consumption-could raise prices at
the production level. He contended that it would not accomplish
the proposed aim of increasing farmers' incomes because the legis-
lation would compound rather than relieve the problem of exces-
sive production.4 7  Nevertheless, the public was being forced to
assume a heavy burden:
Not only does the statute interfere arbitrarily with the rights of
the little grocer to conduct his business according to standards
long accepted ... but it takes away the liberty of 12,000,000
consumers to buy a necessity of life in an open market. It im-
poses direct and arbitrary burdens upon those already seriously
impoverished with the alleged immediate design of affording
special benefits to others. To him with less than 9 cents it says:
You cannot procure a quart of milk from the grocer although he
is anxious to accept what you can pay and the demands of your
household are urgent! A superabundance; but no child can
purchase from a willing storekeeper below the figure appointed
by three men at headquarters! And this is true although the
storekeeper himself may have bought from a willing producer at
half that rate and must sell quickly or lose his stock through
deterioration. The fanciful scheme is to protect the farmer
against undue exactions by prescribing the price at which milk
disposed of by him at will may be resold!478
Justice McReynolds concluded:
The Legislature cannot lawfully destroy guaranteed rights of
one man with the prime purpose of enriching another, even if for
the moment, this may seem advantageous to the public. ...
Grave concern for embarrassed farmers is everywhere; but this
should neither obscure the rights of others nor obstruct judicial
appraisement of measures proposed for relief. The ultimate
welfare of the producer, like that of every other class, requires
dominance of the Constitution. And zealously to uphold this in
all its parts is the highest duty intrusted to the courts.47 9
474 Id. at 548-49, 551.
475 Id. at 552-55.
476 Id. at 556.
477 Id. at 556-57.
478 Id. at 557-58.
479 Id. at 558-59.
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Justice Roberts chose to ignore this argument, citing the numer-
ous instances when regulation has been upheld under what he as-
serted amounted to a reasonableness standard.48 ° The majority
also failed to seriously probe the effectiveness of the law. Yet, eve-
ryone on that Court likely would have agreed that any senseless
and needless restraint is an unreasonable, arbitrary invasion of
individual freedom that a court is obligated to overturn. Justice
McReynolds put it this way: "If a statute to prevent conflagra-
tions, should require householders to pour oil on their roofs as a
means of curbing the spread of fire when discovered in the neigh-
borhood, we could hardly uphold it."48 '
That the means-setting minimum retail prices-was un-
likely to accomplish the objective-increasing the farmers' in-
come-is evident from an analysis of the background of the
legislation. First, the New York Assembly adopted the statute in
question in a crisis atmosphere. Farmers were striking and news
reports told of violence.48 2 Legislators from farm areas called for
passage as a means of terminating the strike and the bloodshed,
and of restoring calm.48 3 They pleaded with their colleagues to do
something, even if the results were far from perfect.484 The origi-
nal draft of the bill allowed the board to fix minimum prices for
producers and maximum prices for consumers.48 5 Changes were
subsequently made to satisfy both the large milk dealers and farm
representatives.48 6 Noticeably absent from the discussions and ne-
gotiations were representatives of the small retail stores. Al-
though the Nebbias were vitally affected, they appear to have had
virtually no input into the legislative deliberations. Second, es-
tablishing a retail minimum price would not lead to the increased
consumption upon which the farmers had to depend for improved
revenues.487 Minimum price requirements impede market-clear-
ing processes."' While the precise impact of fixing minimum
prices depends on the severity of the controls and the elasticity of
demand, it is likely to cause a reduction in consumption, thereby
exacerbating, not alleviating, the milk producers' woes.489 Per
capita consumption in New York City had already dropped, as a
result of the Depression, from four-fifths of a pint each day in 1930
480 Id. at 524-27, 536-37.
481 Id. at 556 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
482 Pass Bill to Fix Prices for Milk, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1933, at 1.
483 Id. at 1, 3.
484 Id.
485 The Milk Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1933, at 16.
486 Id.
487 No Milk Strike, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1933, at 16.
488 Id.
489 Id.
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to three-quarters in 1933.490 This data suggests a significant
causal relationship between consumption of milk and its price.
The large retailers, however, argued otherwise. They as-
serted that their existence was threatened by price-cutting and
that if they were forced out of business, milk distribution would be
disastrously impaired to the serious detriment of the producers.491
The lower and upper court opinions are devoid of any evidence
substantiating these assertions, both of which are difficult to ac-
cept, especially because of the relatively short period the law was
to be in effect. The large retailers could hardly be ruined within
one year. Changes in economic conditions may affect entrepre-
neurs differently, and usually this does not justify preserving the
existence or profits of those adversely affected. Any other policy
would support inefficient enterprise. The large retailers' legisla-
tive success explains more about politics than economics. The
price-cutters seem to have been sacrificed for political rather than
economic reasons.
The legislation aroused much opposition in New York City.
Within a month after passage of the statute, the Milk Board
raised prices by one cent a quart.492 Mayor La Guardia, officials of
the largest milk distributors in the city, and the health commis-
sion, among others, condemned the increase.493 The mayor sought
federal help to protect consumers: if the city could obtain milk
from the Department of Agriculture, this supply would not be sub-
ject to the price-fixing powers of the Milk Board .49 The small
dealers also protested the increase and other board policies. Ap-
proximately fifty members of an organization representing retail
grocers accompanied their spokesman to city hall to complain that
the Board was "in league with the large milk distributers to dis-
criminate against the small retailer," and that "gorilla tactics"
were employed by the authorities against small retailers accused
of violating the law.495 The Milk Board subsequently issued a di-
rective to dealers to pass along to the producers any profits accru-
ing from the fixed minimum prices.496
The milk price control law was inspired by public passions
and pressures, and its final form was dictated by lobbyists for
farmers and large milk dealers.497 Only by accident can measures
conceived under these circumstances justify the restraints they
impose on people. The situation is precisely the type that war-
490 Id.
491 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 518 (1934).
492 La Guardia Fights Rise in Milk Price, N.Y. TimEs, Apr. 21, 1934, at 17.
493 Id.
494 Id.
495 Grocers Accuse State Milk Board, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 26, 1934, at 18.
496 Milk Control Act, ch. 158, § 312(c), 1934 N.Y. Laws 558 (repealed 1934).
497 See supra notes 492-93 and accompanying text.
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rants the kind of judicial oversight that the Supreme Court repu-
diated in this case.
The minority views in Nebbia did not mollify the critics of eco-
nomic due process. By then the die had already been cast. Small
entrepreneurs work long hours, and their returns resemble wages
more than profits. At the time of Nebbia, "Ma and Pa" stores re-
quired very lengthy hours of labor weekly by at least one family
member.498 The commentators were not prone to empathize with
shopkeepers who labor for the sake of profits.
Indeed, Nebbia had all the trappings of radical drama: power-
ful interests, depression, exploitation, excessive milk prices, and
criminal sanctions. Still it has received no recognition from those
who condemn the wickedness of substantive due process. Surely
McReynolds's dissent would have been described as powerful, elo-
quent, and moving in a setting more to the liking of the critics.
His prose is scarcely in keeping with the image of old-guard reac-
tionaries and those who tread on the rights of the masses. For
lawyers, this language should be very provocative. The questions
remain, however, why have so many legal commentators missed
the point of economic due process? Were Holmes and Brandeis
really the heroes of that Court?
3. Wage Rates
In 1918, Congress enacted a statute for the District of Colum-
bia, establishing a board to fix minimum wages for women and
minors in various industries.499 Two suits filed to restrain the
board from prescribing wages were consolidated for the decision of
the United States Supreme Court. °° One was brought by the cor-
porate owner of a children's hospital that employed a large num-
ber of women in different capacities and paid some less than the
minimum wage specified by the board.501 Lyons, a twenty-one-
year-old woman employed as an elevator operator in a hotel,
brought the other action.0 2 She alleged that she would be fired
because her employer would not pay the designated minimum
503 shwage, and she stated that her pay was the highest that she was
able to obtain for any work she was capable of performing. 04 In
1923, in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 5 the Supreme Court, per
Justice Sutherland, held the law unconstitutional on a vote of five
498 See BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIc LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 143, 353 n.50
(1980).
499 Minimum Wage Act of 1918, ch. 174, 40 Stat. 960 (1918).
500 Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
501 Id. at 542.
502 Id.
503 Id.
504 Id. at 542-43.
505 Id. at 525.
2003]
Chapman Law Review
to three, with Justice Brandeis not participating. Sutherland con-
cluded that no exceptional circumstances existed to warrant this
abridgment of freedom of contract. °
Justice Sutherland saw the D.C. statute as mandating em-
ployers to pay wages for which they received nothing in return. °7
To the extent that the wage exceeded the fair value of the services
rendered, it amounted to a compulsory exaction from the employer
for the support of a partially indigent person, for whose situation
the employer was not responsible."°' Therefore, the law arbitrar-
ily shifted to the employer a burden that, if it belonged to any-
body, belonged to society as a whole.5 °9 A comparable purpose
could be applied to govern other transactions; for example, the
purchase of goods likewise burdening entrepreneurs and the econ-
omy.51 0 In fact, if such legislation were to be held legally justified,
the police power would have been substantially increased so that
it would admit even the imposition of maximum wage controls.51'
Thus, the arguments urged in this case to the disadvantage of the
employer could later be invoked to the detriment of the employee.
Sutherland rejected the position that women require restric-
tions that could not lawfully be imposed on men under similar
circumstances.
[W]hile the physical differences must be recognized in appropri-
ate cases, and legislation fixing hours or conditions of work may
properly take them into account, we cannot accept the doctrine
that women of mature age, sui juris, require or may be subjected
to restrictions upon their liberty of contract which could not law-
fully be imposed in the case of men under similar circumstances.
To do so would be to ignore all the implications to be drawn from
the present day trend of legislation, as well as that of common
thought and usage, by which woman is accorded emancipation
from the old doctrine that she must be given special protection
or be subjected to special restraint in her contractual and civil
relationships.12
In addition, the majority believed that the wage restriction would
subject business to a substantial burden, especially because it ap-
plied both to big business and to small, weak employers, without
taking into account periods of economic difficulties or crippling
losses, both of which could leave the employer without adequate
506 Id. at 561-62.
507 Id. at 558-59.
5o8 Id. at 557-58.
509 Id.
510 Id. at 558-59.
511 Id. at 560-61.
512 Id. at 553.
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means of livelihood. 13 To the contention that the law would serve
the public interest, Sutherland replied:
It has been said that legislation of the kind now under review is
required in the interest of social justice, for whose ends freedom
of contract may lawfully be subjected to restraint. The liberty of
the individual to do as he pleases, even in innocent matters, is
not absolute. It must frequently yield to the common good, and
the line beyond which the power of interference may not be
pressed is neither definite nor unalterable, but may be made to
move, within limits not well defined, with changing need and
circumstance. Any attempt to fix a rigid boundary would be un-
wise as well as futile. But, nevertheless, there are limits to the
power, and, when these have been passed, it becomes the plain
duty of the courts in the proper exercise of their authority to so
declare. To sustain the individual freedom of action contem-
plated by the Constitution is not to strike down the common
good, but to exalt it; for surely the good of society as a whole
cannot be better served than by the preservation against arbi-
trary restraint of the liberties of its constituent members.1 4
Chief Justice Taft and Justice Holmes each wrote dissents.515
Both accepted the differentiation of the sexes. 16 The former ar-
gued that the law could be upheld on the basis of prior decisions
and because sufficient reason existed for the congressional ac-
tion.517 Chief Justice Taft believed that although some hardships
would result, "the restriction will inure to the benefit of the gen-
eral class of employees in whose interest the law is passed, and so
to that of the community at large."51 Holmes denied that the
Court had any power in this area, for the Constitution leaves such
matters entirely to the wisdom of the legislators. 19 He wrote that
"th[e] statute did not compel anybody to pay anything," and that
"women [would] not be employed at even the lowest wages allowed
unless they earn[ed] them, or unless the employer's business
[could] sustain the burden."520 The legislature could differentiate
between men and women and Holmes claimed that he would not
hesitate to take such differences into account if he thought "it nec-
essary to sustain this Act."521
In 1937, the United States Supreme Court, by a five-to-four
majority, explicitly overruled Adkins by sustaining a Washington
State statute that established minimum wages for women and mi-
513 Id. at 557.
514 Id. at 561.
515 Id. at 562, 567 (Taft, C.J., & Holmes, J., dissenting).
516 Id. at 566, 569-70.
517 Id. at 563-64. (Taft, C.J., dissenting).
518 Id. at 563.
519 Id. at 567--68. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
520 Id. at 570.
521 Id.
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nors.522 Employing the Nebbia standard, the majority determined
that the law was a reasonable exercise of legislative discretion.5 23
Chief Justice Hughes authored the opinion in the case, West Coast
Hotel v. Parrish,524 which involved an adult hotel worker. This
case marks the formal termination of economic due process. The
same Justices who had dissented in Nebbia also dissented in Par-
rish.25 The Chief Justice explained the decision in part was based
on the difficult economic conditions of the time and "the unparal-
leled demands for relief."526 Chief Justice Hughes' decision con-
tains a perspective about the role of government that had not
often appeared in majority opinions. Rejecting Justice Suther-
land's belief that the common good is predicated on individual
freedom, Chief Justice Hughes equated liberty with the applica-
tion of the police power.
[Tihe liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organization
which requires the protection of law against the evils which
menace the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people.
Liberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the
restraints of due process, and regulation which is reasonable in
relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the com-
munity is due process. 27
Conversely, many feminists of the period saw dangers inher-
ent in protective legislation. 2 ' Like feminists of today, they de-
cried all attempts at encouraging the paternalism that for
centuries had "protected" and harmed them.529 In fact, the Wo-
men's Party filed a brief in Adkins urging the Supreme Court to
strike down the D.C. minimum wage law for women. 30 An odd
coalition of radical feminists and libertarian/conservative Justices
triumphed-for a short time and in a small area-over the com-
bined forces of liberals and unions.
Equal rights advocates now appear to agree that laws limit-
ing a woman's hours and types of work constrict her employment
opportunities. Consequently, women employees challenged a Cal-
ifornia statute limiting the number of hours women could work in
enumerated industries to an eight-hour day and a forty-eight-hour
week.53' These women, who were employees of North American
522 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 386, 400 (1937).
523 Id. at 397-99.
524 Id. at 386.
525 See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 558 (1934) (McReynolds, J., dissenting);
West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 400 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
526 West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 399.
527 Id. at 391.
528 WILLIAM HENRY CHAFE, THE AMERICAN WOMAN: HER CHANGING SOCIAL, ECONOMIC,
AND POLITICAL ROLES, 1920-1970, at 124 (1973).
529 Id. at 125-26.
530 Id. at 127.
531 Mengelkoch v. Indus. Welfare Comm'n, 442 F.2d 1119, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 1971).
[Vol. 6:43
Protecting Economic Liberties
Aviation, Inc., complained that the law gave male employees an
unfair advantage because it denied women overtime employment
and certain positions with the company.532 They alleged that the
act violated their rights under the Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion Clauses and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.111 A lower court
dismissed the case on the theory that prior decisions had fore-
closed examination of the issue.3 4 A circuit court sent the case
back for consideration, observing that circumstances and under-
standing of the problem had changed over the years.535
In another post-Parrish case, the employer refused to promote
a female employee solely because she would have to engage in du-
ties prohibited under the California Labor Code that limited the
hours and work of women.536 A federal court found that the stat-
ute discriminated against women on the basis of their sex and
therefore violated the provisions of the Federal Civil Rights Act of
1964. 537
Justice Hughes' comments in Parrish quoted above stand the
concept of liberty on its head. They are at variance with a funda-
mental idea of our society that the state's power over people is
limited, and are more nearly in keeping with those political phi-
losophies that subordinate the individual to the authority of the
community. Justice Hughes was similarly wrong in his econom-
ics. Imposition of higher wages brings unemployment and reduces
the economy's flexibility, thereby impeding economic recovery.
The Adkins majority did not have the economic data that were
later to emerge, and it probably did not sympathize with feminist
ideology. At that stage in our history, however, the Adkins law
appeared to be a serious imposition on the employment relation-
ship. Employers and employees could claim disadvantages to off-
set contentions that workers would generally benefit. Thus, the
government's argument was not persuasive for a court majority
that believed "the good of society as a whole cannot be better
served than by the preservation against arbitrary restraint of the
liberties of its constituent members." 38
D. The United States Supreme Court's Contemporary Record
On Economic Rights
Three United States Supreme Court decisions covering the
period from 1938 to 1993 present the Court's current position on
532 Id. at 1122.
533 Id.
534 Id.
535 Id.
536 Rosenfeld v. S. Pac. Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219, 1222-23 (C.D. Cal. 1968), affd, 444
F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
537 Id. at 1224.
538 Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 561 (1923).
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the protection of economic liberties: United States v. Carolene
Products Co.,"' Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,540 and
FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc.541
1. United States v. Carolene Products Co.
The United States Filled Milk Act 542 prohibited the shipment
in interstate commerce of any product consisting of skimmed milk
and a fat or oil other than milk fat, which resembled milk or
cream. 54 3 The defendant manufactured and distributed "Milnut,"
a compound of condensed skimmed milk and coconut oil and was
indicted under the Act on the ground that this product "is an
adulterated article of food, injurious to the public health."544 The
statute was directed at compounds which, although safe for con-
sumption, might be substituted for milk, denying the consumer
the nutrients contained in milk.545 Congress rejected efforts to
limit the legislation solely to requiring that the Milnut containers
fully disclose their contents.546
Milnut presented a serious problem for the dairy industry be-
cause it sold for much less than milk.547 In an analysis of the Fil-
led Milk Act, Professor Geoffrey Miller considers it "an utterly
unprincipled example of special interest legislation."54 Miller
writes that proponents of the legislation were various farmer as-
sociations: breed groups; county, state, and national political orga-
nizations; dairy newspapers; agricultural colleges and
universities; granges; and dairy promotional organizations.54
Broadly speaking, these members of the "dairy industry" were
threatened by the low price for the filled milk products compared
to pure dairy products.550 The purpose of the statute was to drive
small producers out of the market, which in the main it accom-
plished, disadvantaging working and poor people deprived of a
"healthful, nutritious, and low-cost food."551
The United States Supreme Court upheld the Act on the basis
of a newly created standard of minimal scrutiny applicable in eco-
539 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
540 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
541 F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993).
542 21 U.S.C. §§ 61-63 (1952).
543 Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 145-46.
544 Id.
545 Id. at 148-49.
546 Id. at 148 n.2 (summarizing the House and Senate Reports).
547 Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 397,
402 (1987).
548 Id. at 398.
549 Id. at 404.
550 Id.
551 Id. at 399.
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nomic matters under which a legislature will inevitably prevail.5 5 2
Ironically, the occasion for the application of this new standard
was one where judicial review under a separation of powers sys-
tem was most appropriate: Congress, responding to politically
powerful forces, had deprived people of their liberty to manufac-
ture and distribute a legitimate article of commerce. The decision
also introduced into constitutional jurisprudence the celebrated
footnote four, which provided a new and highly controversial the-
ory of constitutional interpretation.5 3
According to footnote four, the extent to which legislation
should be subject to judicial scrutiny depends on the legislative
relief available to the complainants. 554 The theory of the footnote
was that those who are denied meaningful access to the political
process and have little realistic chance of influencing lawmakers
should be accorded preferential treatment by the judiciary.55 If a
group has a reasonable opportunity to avail itself of the electoral
and legislative processes to accomplish change in its behalf, judi-
cial aid is not required.556
According to the footnote, racial, religious, and some ethnic
groups are "discrete and insular minorities" that require judicial
intervention on their behalf.5 Producers and sellers do not come
within this category. Yet, in a representative government pre-
mised on majority rule, many people engaged in economic activi-
ties do not have the resources to protect their interests, either at
the ballot box or in the legislative halls. They too can be victims of
perverse, arbitrary, and capricious measures. Under our constitu-
tional system, however, the judiciary's responsibility is to protect
and to not provide special dispensations on the basis of class.
The filled-milk case concerned a denial of liberty with little
resulting benefits to society. The defendant was the producer of a
new product, cheaper than, and a substitute for, milk, and there-
fore a serious competitive threat to the farm and dairy interests.
In time, however, these interests lost their persuasiveness with
the federal judiciary. In 1972, a federal district court invalidated
a filled-milk statute as arbitrary and capricious, and in the ab-
sence of any contrary ruling by a higher court, Milnut-type prod-
ucts may now be marketed freely.558
552 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (stating that legisla-
tion need only have a rational basis and that facts proving rational basis are assumed).
553 Id. at 152 n.4.
554 Id. at 146.
555 Id.
556 Id.
557 Id.
558 See Milnot Co. v. Richardson, 350 F. Supp. 221 (S.D. Ill. 1972).
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2. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.
This case involved a 1977 Minnesota law prohibiting the re-
tail sale of milk in plastic, nonreturnable, nonrefillable contain-
ers.559 The sale of milk in paperboard cartons was not affected by
the law.56 0 The legislature's stated purposes were to promote re-
source conservation, ease solid waste disposal problems, and con-
serve energy."6' Plastic bottle manufacturers and retailers sued to
have the law declared unconstitutional on the basis that it denied
them the liberty to produce and distribute plastic milk bottles, a
legitimate item of commerce.6 2
Applying its version of the minimal scrutiny test, the trial
court initially considered whether the law served important gov-
ernment objectives . 63 Legislatures impose economic regulation
for one or both of the following reasons: first, to cause the eco-
nomic system to function better-that is, to remedy or remove the
excesses or limitations of the private market; and second, to se-
cure an economic advantage for a person, corporation, or group by
legally limiting the rights of competing businesses, occupations,
products, or services.
A law passed to achieve the second reason serves private in-
terests and not important governmental objectives. In addition to
denying liberty to some person or group, such a law also tends to
reduce production and competition, and thereby increases costs,
which disadvantages many persons while benefiting only a few. It
takes from A and gives to B for the benefit of B. In the Minnesota
plastic bottle case, the state trial court found that, contrary to the
stated purposes, the "'actual basis' for the Act" was to promote the
interests of certain parts of the local dairy industry and the pulp-
wood industry, and to harm the interests of other segments of the
dairy industry and the plastics industry. 64 It held the law
unconstitutional. 5
Suppose, however, that the court found that the law sought to
increase competition and productivity, to eliminate waste, or to
improve the environment. These are important governmental
objectives. The next question is whether the law will substan-
tially achieve these objectives, in order to satisfy what is usually
referred to as a means-ends test. The Minnesota Supreme Court
assumed that the articulated purposes motivated the legislature,
559 Act of May 26, 1977, ch. 268, 1977 Minn. Laws 440.
560 Id. § 2.
561 Id. § 1.
562 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 458 (1981).
563 Id. at 460.
564 Id.
565 Id.
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566but held that the law would not achieve these purposes. 6 There-
fore, the restraint on liberty was futile and oppressive.
567
The United States Supreme Court reversed.168 It found that
the Minnesota Supreme Court wrongfully "did not reverse on the
basis of ... [the District Court's] patent violation of the principles
governing rationality analysis under the Equal Protection
Clause."569 The trial court had not been sufficiently deferential to
the legislature.5 70 The Supreme Court held that the determining
factor under the minimal review test is whether the legislative
means is "rationally related to achievement of the statutory pur-
poses."571 The parties had agreed at the final level of litigation
that the legislature had truthfully articulated its purposes.572
The state identified four reasons why the distinction between
the plastic and non-plastic nonreturnables was rationally related
to the articulated statutory purposes . 3 The Unites States Su-
preme Court stated that if any one of the four substantiates the
state's claim, the Act must be sustained . 4 The Minnesota Su-
preme Court upheld the invalidation of the law, rejecting the
stated reasons on an empirical basis 575 The legislature's conclu-
sions were "speculative and illusory," not sensible, or totally
wrong.7 6 Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court re-
versed each ruling on the ground that it is not the function of the
Court to substitute its evaluation of legislative facts for that of the
legislature.
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, stated:
Respondents apparently have not challenged the theoretical con-
nection between a ban on plastic nonreturnables and the pur-
poses articulated by the legislature; instead, they have argued
that there is no empirical connection between the two. They
produced impressive supporting evidence at trial to prove that
the probable consequences of the ban on plastic nonreturnable
milk containers will be to deplete natural resources, exacerbate
solid waste disposal problems, and waste energy, because con-
sumers unable to purchase milk in plastic containers will turn
to paperboard milk cartons, allegedly a more environmentally
harmful product.
566 Clover Leaf Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 289 N.W.2d 79, 85 (Minn. 1979).
567 Id. at 86.
568 Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 474.
569 Id. at 464.
570 Id. at 469.
571 Id. at 461-63.
572 Id. at 462-63.
573 Id. at 465.
574 Id.
575 Clover Leaf Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 289 N.W.2d 79, 85-87 (Minn. 1979).
576 Id. at 86.
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But states are not required to convince the courts of the correct-
ness of their legislative judgments. Rather, "those challenging
the legislative judgment must convince the court that the legis-
lative facts on which the classification is apparently based could
not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental
decisionmaker."57 7
Justice Brennan's decision makes it virtually impossible to
limit a legislative decision because lawmakers almost invariably
contend that they believe in the efficacy of the rules they impose.
He thus accords carte blanche powers to legislatures, something
he is reluctant to do in many other areas of the law, presumably
because of his judicial obligation to protect liberties.
3. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc.
The complainants in Beach Communications were operators
of SMATV Cable Services .1 7 A SMATV system typically receives
a signal from a satellite through a small dish located on a rooftop,
and then transmits the signal by wire to units within a building or
complex of buildings.579 In providing for the regulation of cable
television facilities, Congress drew a distinction between facilities
that serve separately owned or managed buildings and those that
serve one or more buildings under common ownership or manage-
ment." ° Cable facilities in the latter category were exempt from
regulation. 58 1 Beach Communications presented the question of
whether there was sufficient reason to justify this distinction for
purposes of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment."2
The complainants, who serviced separately owned or managed
buildings, asserted that they, like those who were exempt, were
entitled to engage freely in this legitimate business activity.85
Since the statutory classification involved economic liberties and
neither implicated a suspect class nor infringed upon fundamental
constitutional rights, the courts considering the matter applied
the minimal scrutiny test under which the classification would be
upheld if any reasonably conceivable facts could support it. 5"
Merely stating this rule suggests the answer: it is difficult to
imagine a classification that would not succeed under such a
broad, subjective test. Nevertheless, two members of a three
judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cir-
577 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463-64 (quoting Vance v.
Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979)).
578 F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 311 (1993).
579 Id.
580 Id. at 309.
581 Id.
582 Id.
583 Beach Communications, Inc. v. F.C.C., 959 F.2d 975, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
584 Id. at 988-89 (Mikva, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment).
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cuit concluded: "We see no 'rational basis' for the distinction
.... "I" The concurring judge was not similarly troubled. He con-
tended that his colleagues showed "too little reluctance to over-
turn complex economic legislation under the minimal rational-
basis test.""6
Under the rational-basis test, the reasons need not be persua-
sive, just conceivable. 587 Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court,
Justice Thomas was not impressed with the Circuit Court major-
ity's limited imagination, and the Court reversed. He noted:
"Whether the posited reason for the challenged distinction actu-
ally motivated Congress is 'constitutionally irrelevant. '' 58 8 Thus,
Justice Thomas thought that the exception was based on the small
size of single owner or managed complexes. When counsel as-
serted that an exception on the basis of size, which prior regula-
tions contained, was not included in the legislation being
challenged, Justice Thomas replied that it did not make any dif-
ference what the legislators actually contemplated, the critical
question was whether the legislators might conceivably have so
intended.8 9
Justice Thomas's second conceivable basis for the statutory
distinction related to the "monopoly power" the provider of cable
TV for separately owned and managed buildings would obtain by
the initial installation of a dish that would allow additional build-
ings to be connected for the small cost of a cable, an arrangement
not available for single owned or managed developments.9 0
Whether the difference is sufficient to warrant regulation is a
matter that merits considerable inquiry, which would not be re-
quired under the minimal scrutiny test. Frequently, regulation
leads to price increases. Regardless, for constitutional purposes,
the distinction may be based on speculation. "Congress had to
draw the line somewhere . . ." and, therefore, wrote Justice
Thomas, "the precise coordinates of the resulting legislative judg-
ment [are] virtually unreviewable, since the legislature must be
allowed leeway to approach a perceived problem incrementally."591
V. CONCLUSION
The Framers of the original Constitution did not append a bill
of rights or include most of the protections of such a bill in the
585 Id. at 977.
586 Id. at 988 (Mikva, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment).
587 Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 313-14.
588 Id. at 318 (quoting United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
589 Id. at 315, 318-19.
590 Id. at 319-20.
591 Id. at 316.
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Constitution. They limited and enumerated the powers of the gov-
ernment and granted it no authority to deprive the people of their
common law rights. Therefore, there was no need for protecting
their rights in the Constitution. James Madison stated that the
Constitution would never have been ratified if the people thought
their liberties were in danger.59 2 As Alexander Hamilton asserted,
"For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no
power to do?"593 Since the common law secured economic rights,
these would have been protected even if the Bill of Rights was not
ratified.
The Framers were not despots seeking to create an authorita-
rian state. On the contrary, they wanted to encourage liberty as
the best means to produce a free, viable, and productive society.
The liberties that Edward Coke and William Blackstone identified
would accomplish this purpose. Courts in the United States con-
tinued to apply common law rules long after the Bill of Rights was
ratified. Thus, in 1855 in Murray's Lessee,594 the United States
Supreme Court interpreted due process of law consistent with Ed-
ward Coke's definition, and as late as 1907, in an opinion by Jus-
tice Holmes,595 the Court defined protected expression consistent
with Blackstone's definition.
When the Constitution was framed, separation of powers,
checks and balances, and judicial review were political and eco-
nomic ideas. They would safeguard the individual in his personal,
business, or professional life from governmental oppression. Soci-
ety would benefit because liberty was regarded as the greatest en-
couragement to wisdom, productivity, creativity, and
contentment. The same reasoning remains applicable today. We
still rely on freedom to advance understanding and culture, as
well as to supply food, clothing, and shelter. Yet those constitu-
tional concepts now operate to augment liberty in one area and
not in the other.
Prior to the ratification of the Constitution, the state legisla-
tures were the final arbiters in economic affairs-much as now.
We have it on the authority of Madison, Hamilton, and Marshall
that the legislatures used this power in a manner that seriously
harmed individuals and the economy. 96 These practices were a
leading factor prompting the framing and adoption of the
Constitution.
592 Letter from James Madison to Judge Roane (Sept. 2. 1819), reprinted in THE
REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 435 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) (1911).
593 See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, supra note 184, at 513.
594 Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272,
275-77, 282 (1855).
595 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
596 See supra Part IV.
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The situation is little improved today. In earlier times in our
history, the success of a business was dependent upon its accepta-
bility in the marketplace. Entrepreneurs who best satisfied con-
sumers prospered, while those less competent or efficient fared
poorly and were often forced out of business. Today, this economic
competition is increasingly replaced by political competition.
Losers in the economic arena seek relief from legislators who have
the power to make them winners. One law can offset a score of
inefficiencies. The scenario is no different when it comes to occu-
pations, trades, and professions, for here again political power en-
joys supremacy over ability, talent, and competence.
The application of judicial review to economic matters will not
restore laissez-faire to our economy, but we should at least expect
reduction of legislative and administrative excesses and abuses.
This is an outcome not to be minimized, as the rewards of liberty
are vast and unpredictable.
